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Abstract 
 
 
V.K. Wellington Koo (顧維鈞) was a uniquely accomplished diplomat whose career in 
foreign relations spanned seven decades. His career began as English Secretary under Yuan 
Shikai during the early part of the 20
th
 century and ended when he retired as a judge from the 
World Court in 1967. This thesis will focus on his tenure as Chinese ambassador to the United 
States from 1946-1956. I will show that during this period, Koo embodied a unique identity of 
modern China that was characterized by anti-communist foreign policy and a close relationship 
with the United States, while rooted in traditional Chinese values  and events surrounding the 
1919 May 4
th
 Movement. This period (1946-1956) will center on the Chinese Civil War, the 
outbreak of the Korean War and the alignment of Truman Doctrine principles with the national 
goals of Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee, and the redoubling of China Lobby efforts in the 
early to mid-1950s. I will support my claims through an exhaustive examination of interpersonal 
correspondences between Koo and American and Chinese elites who influenced foreign policy 
(e.g., lobbyists, officials, businesspeople, and debutantes). I will also supplement this discussion 
with biographical works, books on Chinese identity, and articles concerning various global 
conflicts. My thesis contributes to scholarship on modern China by providing a new biographical 
lens through which scholars can better understand the factors that influenced the evolution of 
Chinese foreign policy after WWII and Koo’s role during this turbulent decade. 
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V. K. Wellington Koo (aged 25) presumably outside of Butler Library at Columbia University, 1912 
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Preface  
 I became interested in studying Wellington Koo due to my father’s mentioning of a 
Columbia University associate of his who had begun a project on his life and times. Koo came 
across as an enigmatic and slightly obscure figure that appeared to possess some significance in 
modern Chinese history. After reviewing a fair amount of scholarship on the early part of his 
career regarding his involvement with the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, I felt that it would be of 
value to investigate the second to last part of his career in foreign relations—his ambassadorship 
to the United States from 1946-56.  
 Originally, I considered a variety of topics relating to Koo such as his thoughts and 
actions toward Chinese troops in Burma after World War II or the status of Taiwan. However, I 
decided that using the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) developmental experience as a case study for 
national development similar to the Republic of China (ROC) would be a worthwhile endeavor.   
 The title of this work, “Wellington Koo’s Dream of National Identity: Transitioning to a 
Modern China (1946-1956),” suggests that Koo’s service throughout his career focused on 
creating a Chinese national identity in a decade of upheaval (1946-1956) that was defined by 
World War II, the Chinese Civil War, the Cold War, the Korean War, and the First Taiwan Strait 
Crisis. Koo represented a unique national identity: One that seemed contradictorily defined by 
Chinese patriotism and Western ideals and values. The events of this decade shaped Koo’s 
perception of this Chinese identity as much as his own ideas did. This title reflects the central 
goal I hope to achieve in writing this thesis. By exploring the concepts of anti-communism, anti-
imperialism, traditional Chinese culture, and self-determination, I will show how and why Koo 
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embraced these notions that formed his conception of China’s identity. These ideas and the 
resulting identity formed the basis for Koo’s dream of what modern China ought to become. 
I conducted much of my research at the Koo Archive in the Columbia University Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library that possesses over 90,000 items. I acquired other primary sources 
from the Eisenhower and Truman Presidential Libraries, Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS) series, and through the University of Colorado’s interlibrary loan system. Moreover, I 
found other primary sources online such as forms of media in the 1950s involving Koo and text 
from United Nations resolutions. Secondary sources include biographies on Koo, articles on the 
Korean War and policies of the Republic of China (ROC), and books and articles concerning the 
so-called “China Lobby.” 
 After synthesizing this research, I determined that through the use of social and political 
historical lenses I could write an unconventional diplomatic history of Wellington Koo and his 
impact on China as well as the international scene during the middle of the 20
th
 century. By 
examining Koo’s papers, I gained an understanding of how interpersonal correspondences 
between Koo and an array of politicians, business leaders, and other officials influenced the way 
in which Chinese foreign policy was crafted. Moreover, I gained insight on Koo’s dream of a 
modern Chinese state and a sustained modern national identity.  
 I also decided not to write on other diplomatic figures of the era such as Zhou Enlai 
(Inaugural Premier of the People’s Republic of China) or John Foster Dulles (Secretary of State 
under President Eisenhower) due to the abundance of scholarship already in existence. Dr. Koo 
seemed to serve as a means to revealing nuances in Chinese diplomacy during a turbulent decade 
 9 
 
while simultaneously expanding the body of research on an otherwise understudied Nationalist 
figure.  
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Introduction 
One of China’s greatest patriots was the underestimated Nationalist diplomat V.K. 
Wellington Koo. During the entirety of his career, Wellington Koo devoted his efforts toward the 
development of Chinese nationhood and a unique Chinese identity in the midst of revolution and 
wars. Although Koo’s cultivation of this identity began with his refusal to sign the problematic 
Treaty of Versailles (1919), his tenure as Chinese Ambassador to the United States (1946-1956) 
will serve as the focal point for this thesis due to the turbulence of the post-World War II period. 
This period characterized by many transitions and overlaps in the political sphere revealed 
emerging national goals in the wake of a changing world order. WWII reshaped the social, 
economic, and political framework of East and West due to military conquest and a search for 
new national identities. The Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) represented a literal and 
metaphorical battle between old and new Chinas and the Korean War (1950-1953) signified the 
first large-scale confrontation of the Cold War.  
This period of transition and overlap led to a rise in new political classifications. In this 
work, the country “China” will be referred to at many times and in different contexts. Up until 
1949, the Chinese mainland was under the control of Nationalist Chinese forces under Chiang 
Kai-shek’s leadership. After October 1949, the mainland fell under the control of the Chinese 
Communists under Mao Zedong. This transition of power occurred as a result of Chinese 
Communist victory during the Chinese Civil War. After December 1949, the Republic of China 
(ROC) controlled only the island of Taiwan. Moreover, the popular press terms “Free China” and 
“Red China” will refer to the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China respectively 
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in the context of the era. Taibei and Beijing also refer to these two countries' central governments. 
The terms First and Second World will refer to various democracies allied with the United States 
and communist states aligned with the Soviet Union, respectively. “Communist” and this word’s 
transformations will refer to a specific Communist Party (e.g., The Chinese Communist Party), 
while the word “communist” will refer to the general ideology. 
Koo developed relationships (positive, negative, and occasionally neutral) with many 
international business leaders, government officials, and publication editors during this period of 
disruption. These individuals included but were not limited to: Madame Chiang Kai-shek, 
President Harry Truman, U.S. diplomat John Carter Vincent, Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, U.S. 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs George Yeh. 
Over the years, these relationships on balance strengthened the position of the ROC in the world 
in spite of massive losses as the Chinese Communists consolidated control over the mainland and 
received additional assistance from the Soviet Union. These powerful relationships provided part 
of the basis for Koo’s dream that a modern, free China would prevail. In the United States this 
coalition of ROC supporters became known as the “China Lobby,” due to their lobbying of 
Congress for moral and material support. 
Wellington Koo represented a force of stability. His English language skills, elite 
education, and adherence to an unwavering patriotism toward China—its history/culture and 
potential as a great power—bridged otherwise marked differences between East and West. His 
lengthy service in diplomacy as China’s representative to the Paris Peace Conference, his 
participation in The League of Nations and United Nations, and his ambassadorships to France 
and Great Britain made him a familiar face to the Western World. From the West’s point of view, 
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Koo embodied the potential of modern China. In the decade of 1946-1956, Koo emerged as an 
important figure due to his mission to the U.S. to procure aid in December 1948, an attempt to 
remedy the negative effects of the China White Paper of 1949, his December 23, 1949 letter to 
the Secretary of State Dean Acheson, his support of an anti-communist alliance managed by 
Asians during the Korean War, his negotiation of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty of 
1954, public condemnation of the CCP during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, and his appearances 
on national television programs to garner public support toward the ROC during the 1950s. In 
contrast to perceptions of ambassadors performing only social duties, Wellington Koo was an 
activist for national causes. 
Wellington Koo’s personal philosophy, which was maintained over the course of his life 
and shaped foreign policy decisions, had both Chinese and international origins. By growing up 
in Shanghai’s International Settlement, Koo developed a unique understanding of the West that 
consisted of acceptance of Western attitudes and customs. Even “Wellington,” the Anglo first 
name that Koo publically adopted circa 1912, signified respect for Western culture.
1
 When Koo 
studied abroad at Columbia University, he participated in the debate team and edited the school 
newspaper, thereby demonstrating that he was not an isolated Chinese national.
2
 Also at 
Columbia, Koo had contact with Woodrow Wilson well before Wilson became U.S. President. 
This early personal encounter may have been the reason that Koo held Wilson in high esteem for 
his political thoughts that aligned with the patriotic ambitions of the Chinese people.
3
 Koo’s 
warm feelings toward the United States only deepened during the early part of his career. After 
                                                          
1
 Stephen G. Craft, V.K. Wellington Koo:  Emergence of Modern China (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 2004), 4-5. 
2
 Ibid, 17. 
3
 Ibid, 46. 
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graduating from Columbia and relocating to China to serve as English Secretary to Yuan Shikai, 
Koo arranged for the delivery of The New York Times to his new residence in Beijing.
4
 In 1916 
after becoming minister to the United States under the Yuan government, Koo advocated 
increased trade between the U.S. and China since, in his words, “no two countries could be better 
qualified to cooperate.”5 Koo argued that the U.S. and China would benefit from this cooperation 
because the Chinese "know that Americans are as honest as themselves."
6
  
 Although Koo developed progressive views (such as rejecting the concept of arranged 
marriage) after growing up in the cosmopolitan city of Shanghai and studying on the Upper West 
Side of Manhattan (Columbia University B.A. Liberal Arts 1908, Ph.D. International Law and 
Diplomacy 1912), he was nonetheless a product of imperial China having graduated from college 
before the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911.
7
 Thus, he valued tradition and age-old aspects 
of Chinese culture that was at loggerheads against the vision of the Chinese Communists. When 
Koo retired to New York City in 1967, he saw the Chinese mainland controlled by the 
“Communist Bandits” he long opposed. Over the decades, Koo’s conception of the world’s 
understanding of China changed with the times. Yet his abhorrence for communism and his 
certainty of its destructive effects on Chinese culture never wavered. When Mao invited Koo to 
visit the PRC in 1972, Koo refused the offer and never returned to mainland China.
8
 
 Koo adhered to traditional aspects of Chinese culture (such as promoting the concept of 
filial piety) in part due to his age.
9
 As a child, Koo received a classical Chinese education that 
                                                          
4
 “Columbia Student Yuan’s Secretary,” The New York Times, April 1, 1912. 
5
 “China’s Minister Invites Americans to Trade,” The New York Times, May 28, 1916. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Stephen Craft, V.K. Wellington Koo:  Emergence of Modern China, 29. 
8
 Ibid, 252. 
9
 Wellington Koo, “The Status of Aliens in China” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1912), 5 (dedication page). 
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required him to write “eight-legged essays” and to memorize works about Confucianism as 
preparation for the Chinese civil service exams.
10
 As he had nearly completed his dissertation at 
Columbia by the time of the 1911 Revolution, policies and culture of the Qing Dynasty had 
indeed heavily influenced his upbringing. As such, these early influences allowed Koo to remain 
sympathetic toward traditional aspects of Chinese culture in his adult life. All the while, after the 
creation of the Republic in 1912, Chinese created a new identity based on nationhood. Henrietta 
Harrison argues that this identity emerged when Chinese “wore their hair short, adopted elements 
of Western clothing and celebrated holidays commemorating events of the Republic based on the 
new solar calendar.”11 As seen in the photograph on page two, Koo adopted this identity early in 
his career.  
The following sections will analyze the extent to which Koo’s vision of modern China 
that maintained traditional culture while adopting Western ideas materialized in the form of a 
unique Chinese identity from 1946-1956. “Koo and ROC Foreign Policy (1946-1949)” will 
examine Koo’s promotion of the Nationalists’ image during the continuing Chinese Civil War 
after WWII. “The Korean War and its Relevance (1950-1953)” will show how Koo articulated 
the alignment of ROC values and ambitions with those of the United States and Republic of 
Korea during the Korean War. “ROC Foreign Policy in the Aftermath (1953-1956)” will 
demonstrate Koo’s role in securing the future development of the ROC during the final three 
years of his diplomatic career.  
 
                                                          
10
 Ibid, 8; Ibid 28. 
11
 Henrietta Harrison, China: Inventing the Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 4. 
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Koo and ROC Foreign Policy (1946-1949) 
 
 World War II wreaked havoc on China psychologically and physically. From this period 
of death and destruction, China began transitioning from a state in shambles to a power on the 
world stage. Wellington Koo served as an agent of external affairs between the Republic of 
China and the United States from 1946-1956. His work with a variety of U.S. government 
officials (e.g., President Truman and General Marshall) prompted a reconsideration of China’s 
role in world affairs. Two billion dollars in aid to China during its civil war signified the ROC 
government’s heightened importance to the U.S.12 
The status of China under Nationalist control was an enormously important foreign 
policy issue for communist and non-communist nations alike. The precariousness of this 
situation laid the groundwork for future conflict between First and Second World countries 
worldwide. The way in which alliances were constructed, perceptions of the ROC were 
understood, and how elites in China and abroad influenced diplomacy shaped China’s 
geopolitical status in the world. This section will examine the conditions that transpired, which 
altered the course of China’s history with respect to Cold War developments inside of Asia. 
These major events took the form of Koo’s early meetings with President Truman, Madame 
Chiang’s visit to the United States, U.S. cynicism toward the Guomindang circa 1949, the 
publication of the China White Paper, and the end to the Chinese Civil War. 
                                                          
12
 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945-1996. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 27.  
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In 1946, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Wellington Koo as the ambassador to the United 
States since he “liked Koo” and thought his demeanor was appropriate for the job.13 Washington 
Post reporter Edward T. Folliard characterized Koo as an able, accomplished, and worthy 
ambassador. He wrote that people generally admired Dr. Koo’s fluency in English and his 
representation of China at the Washington (1921-1922) and Dumbarton Oaks Conferences (1944) 
that addressed international cooperation and disarmament.
14
 Many people in the United States—
especially Republicans—embraced this characterization of Koo and his representation of 
Nationalist China since it remained firmly opposed to international communism. Much like 
Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Koo came to the United States representing a China to which 
Americans could relate.  Americans admired his English skills, embrace of Christianity, and his 
Western sensibilities. After becoming Ambassador, Koo embarked on a charm offensive to sway 
public sympathy in favor of Nationalist China. He sought closer ties with politicians, 
professional journalists, and other writers to advance acceptance of China’s policies. 
Additionally, Koo desired to bring textbooks and art exhibits into schools to educate the younger 
generation about China.
15
 In this way he could not only influence opinion through legislation and 
public appearances, but could also alter the way in which Americans think about China through 
intervention in the school system.  
Koo’s endeavors in the United States circa 1946 portrayed China as a country in 
transition from an authoritarian state to a functioning democracy.
16
 This skewed portrayal 
became problematic since Americans were aware of military and political occurrences during the 
                                                          
13
 Stephen G. Craft, V.K. Wellington Koo:  Emergence of Modern China, 202. 
14
 “Dr. Koo Arrives to Assume Duties as China Ambassador,” Washington Post, July 6, 1946, Truman Papers. 
15
 Stephen G. Craft, V.K. Wellington Koo:  Emergence of Modern China, 211. 
16
 Ibid., 213. 
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ongoing Chinese Civil War. American knowledge of the brutality of the internal war in China led 
State Department officials to change policy toward China. In an August 10 letter handled by Koo 
from President Truman to Chiang Kai-shek in 1949, Truman attacked the policies of the 
Guomindang (GMD). 
 Truman argued that the “political situation in China has been a grave concern to the 
American people.”17 He went on to write that there was a developing “opinion which holds that 
our entire policy toward China must be reexamined in the light of spreading strife, and especially 
by evidence…to suppress freedom.”18 In accordance with his Doctrine that argued for the 
“support of free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation,” Truman believed in halting 
communist advances worldwide while promoting democratic values.
19
 After Chiang Kai-shek’s 
statement during WWII that referred to the Japanese as a skin disease and the Chinese 
Communists as heart disease, it was clear to American government officials that Chiang would 
go to any means to unify the country. Truman complained that Chiang’s use of censorship, 
militarism, and oppression of intellectuals characterized his approach to consolidating power.  
Koo reacted to the President’s statement by informing the U.S. diplomat John Carter 
Vincent that it was extraordinarily difficult to come to a consensus with the communists and 
incorporate them into the government due to their desire to control the Chinese government, their 
untrustworthiness, and the influence of Moscow. Koo argued that the long-term objective of 
cooperating with the United States should be to prevent Soviet domination of China.
20
  
                                                          
17
 Letter from Truman to Chiang Kai-shek, August 10, 1946, Truman Papers. 
18
 Ibid., 2. 
19
 Christine Compton, Our Documents: 100 Milestone Documents from the National Archives, ed. Michael R. 
Beschloss (New York City: Oxford University Press, 2006), 194. 
20
 Memo of Conversation Koo, Shao-hua, John Carter Vincent, August 13, 1946, Truman Papers. 
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The Minister-Counselor of the Chinese Embassy Dr. Tan Shao-hua largely agreed with 
Ambassador Koo in saying that although it was difficult to destroy Chinese communist forces, it 
was entirely possible to “immunize” the Russian threat.21 Dr. Tan and others were aware of the 
threat and were paranoid of the ambitions of the USSR with respect to bordering nations. The 
central suspicion at hand was that the USSR could manipulate the internal affairs of a country in 
order to overhaul its entire government. Dr. Tan and Dr. Koo held elitist views regarding the 
ordinary populace of China—known colloquially as the lao baixing (老百姓). Dr. Tan spoke of 
the “ignorance of the Chinese masses,” while Koo thought that certain post-WWII Chinese laws 
were “too advanced for the Chinese people.”22 Thus, Tan acknowledged the possibility that 
Chinese could begin to support communist forces due to their “susceptibility to Communist 
propaganda.”23 This recognition on the part of the Nationalists that the Chinese Communists 
appealed to “the masses” effectively outlined the central reason for the appeal and attractiveness 
of communism in China, Vietnam, and Korea. The ideology embraced by Chinese peasants 
called for restructuring of the established social order—thereby threatening GMD officials such 
as Koo and Tan.
24
  
In order to simultaneously appeal to the outside world, the GMD attempted to 
characterize their government as one that embraced democracy, law, and order. A response 
relayed to Truman by Ambassador Koo, quoted Chiang Kai-shek as praising the work of General 
George Marshall. General Marshall—after whom Truman’s Marshall Plan was named—was the 
American envoy to China (December 1945-January 1947) whose duty was to preserve relative 
                                                          
21
 Message to President Chiang Kai-shek, September 9, 1946, Truman Papers, 2. 
22
 Ibid; Stephen Craft, V.K. Wellington Koo:  Emergence of Modern China, 165. 
23
 Ibid., 3. 
24
 Mao Zedong, On New Democracy, (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2003). 
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peace as well as establish a coalition government between the Communists and Nationalists. 
Chiang stated that working with Marshall was progressing nicely as peace and democracy was 
their “common objective.”25 Chiang believed that the lack of progress regarding the situation in 
China could almost entirely be blamed on the Communists due to their lack of sincerity in 
negotiations as well as their “policy to use armed force to seize political power.”26 Truman 
responded to Chiang by acknowledging the severity of fragmentation in China, but stated that 
political unity must be achieved so that the United States could aid China with respect to 
rehabilitating its agrarian and industrial economy in the aftermath of WWII.
27
 The motivations 
behind Truman’s willingness to assist the Guomindang are not entirely clear. What one can say, 
however, is that much like the reasons behind the Marshall Plan Truman thought building up the 
economic well-being of distressed people would lessen the appeal of communism.  
This thought coincided precisely with the machinations of GMD politics. In order to 
shore up assistance (material, moral, and otherwise) from developed Western nations, the 
Nationalists portrayed themselves as part of the West’s common cause to uphold the dignity and 
freedom of peoples. This portrayal mirrored Koo’s articulation of China’s goals at the 1919 Paris 
Peace Conference. In 1946, Life published a multipart article that was largely pro-Guomindang. 
Moreover, it lauded General Marshall and his work in remedying the China situation.
28
 Although 
this article certainly did not represent all of America’s views toward China, it did represent the 
prominent journalist Charles Murphy’s view in a popular magazine. In this sense, at least a 
portion of the American public was convinced that the progression of democracy in China was 
                                                          
25
 Chinese Embassy, August 28, 1946, Truman Papers, 2.  
26
 Ibid., 1-3. 
27“My Dear Mr. Ambassador” Draft, September 5, 1946, Koo Papers. 
28
 Patricia Neils, China Images in the Life and times of Henry Luce (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers,1990), 174. 
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indeed underway. Earlier in the year, this suspicion was partially confirmed at the Political 
Consultative Conference in Chungking. At this conference, Chiang Kai-shek declared that his 
government would immediately grant certain democratic rights.
29
 This declaration in large part 
was a show for American policy makers, as Chinese Communists did not join a coalition 
government.
30
 
On October 29, 1948, Ambassador Koo received a message from the Chinese official 
Chen Chih-mai as an update on changes in U.S. policy toward China. The memo stressed 
underlying issues in terms of the political repercussions from the resignation of Mrs. Luce as 
president of the American China Policy Association, Governor Dewey’s interaction with 
consultants to formulate anti-communist policy, and an attempt to find a suitable person to head 
the China aid program.
31
 Clare Luce’s stepping down from her post as president of the American 
China Policy Association had far reaching consequences to the stability of ROC policy. For one, 
Luce and her husband were vehement anti-communists. Thus, the loss of a predictable stance on 
communism made the ROC uneasy with respect to the future of the China Lobby leadership (i.e., 
high-profile ROC supporters who lobbied the United States government for aid). All the while, 
with the 1948 U.S. presidential election only days away, the ROC remained anxiously in favor of 
Governor Dewey.  
Generally, Republicans viewed communism as a greater threat to global political stability 
than Democrats (see McCarthy et al.). This correspondence between Koo and Chen represents a 
desire on behalf of the ROC for a shift away from the limited aid policies of Truman to the more 
                                                          
29
 Keiji Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek His Life and Times (New York: St. John’s University, 1981), 863. 
30
 Ibid., 864. 
31
 Recent Developments, U.S. China Policy memo from Chen Chih-mai to Ambassador Koo, October 29, 1948, Koo 
Papers. 
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generous aid policies of U.S. Republicans. A policy group of consultants—that included the anti-
communist editor of Plain Talk Isaac Don Levine—met with Republican Governor Dewey to 
expose and expel communist members of the U.S. Civil Service.
32
 Chen alluded to this point in 
his message, as Nationalists were indeed concerned about the “purity” of the bureaucratic system 
of the United States with respect to implementing pro-ROC policies. Additionally, this 
consultant group discussed “general policy vis-à-vis the USSR.”33 Koo and his colleagues no 
doubt wanted to know whether United States officials were as non-cooperative with the USSR as 
perceived. The reasoning behind their efforts likely relates to the Nationalist conviction that the 
USSR was aiding its enemy on the mainland. The final point that arises in this memo regarding 
the head of the China aid program is a debate as to whether the leader of the China military 
group or the U.S. ambassador to China should fill the position. Chen believed that General 
Wedemeyer would be unsuited for the role due to his support of a UN trusteeship governing 
Manchuria post-WWII that presumably challenged Nationalist territorial sovereignty. Chen 
asserted that the current Ambassador (Stuart) was not terribly popular with Republicans and 
likely would be replaced by William C. Bullitt.
34
 Although Chen never mentioned his personal or 
the ROC’s feelings toward either of these diplomats, by reading other documents it is clear that 
the Koo and his contemporaries would have supported the appointment of Bullitt due to his 
hardline stance against communists.
35
    
By November, Wellington Koo transmitted another message to President Truman that 
concerned the determination of Chinese Communists and what it meant to the stability of world 
                                                          
32
 Ibid., 1. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid., 2. 
35
 William C. Bullitt, The Great Globe Itself (New York City: Scribner’s, 1946), 94. 
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affairs. Koo quoted Chiang in outlining the present situation in China and how Chinese 
Communist forces were advancing on strategic regions. The Nationalist government noted that 
“China may be lost to the cause of democracy” if Communist advances were not halted. Chiang 
Kai-shek believed that Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists and Soviet antagonism contributed 
to the decline of GMD military capabilities, since the Communists were able to occupy 
Manchuria.
36
 Chiang’s manner of framing the issue of his military’s deterioration was clever, 
since a proper response to a buildup of aid on behalf of the Communists would be an even larger 
increase of aid to Nationalists from the United States (according to the logic of the Cold War or 
the Truman Doctrine). Additionally, Chiang embraced aspects of the Truman Doctrine in 
referring to his country as a “co-defender of democracy against the onrush and infiltration of 
Communism throughout the world.”37 In this way, the Nationalists appeared to have foreign 
policies identical to the United States. Moreover, Chiang explicitly and implicitly referred to the 
Chinese Communists as foreign invaders due to their close link with Moscow. By classifying 
them as “the other” it seemed reasonable for the United States government to assist the self-
determination of the Chinese people. In his message to President Truman, Ambassador Koo 
asked to meet with him as a preliminary measure before meeting with a Chinese military official 
in order to resolve the situation in China through increased aid.  
Koo and Madame Chiang 
 In the following month, two envoys arrived in the United States to address the progress of 
the GMD as well as foreign aid: Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Wellington Koo. Their 
approaches to negotiation distinctly differed. Madame Chiang insisted that her government 
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needed urgent assistance since the Nationalists were fighting “Soviet communism in China.” She 
supported her statement in drawing a comparison between the Chinese fight against communism 
and the United States’ struggle against communism in Berlin.38 Madame Chiang’s addressing of 
the issue of Germany is critical, since Berlin represented a country divided by ideology and 
politics much like China. She also argued that aid was urgent since salary workers, businessmen, 
and teachers would soon support the Communists due to their promises for a better life.
39
 
Madame Chiang’s approach to requesting aid was direct and based around her desire to maintain 
control over China’s populace so she in turn could remain in power. 
 Koo criticized Madame Chiang’s visit to the United States as a “girlish whim,” since she 
had come to the United States without the consent of Chiang Kai-shek or her government.
 40
 
Nonetheless, Koo had to avoid revealing the conditions of her arrival to the press. Koo 
mentioned to U.S. officials that he was authorized to discuss a solution to the China loan 
problem (i.e., a logjam in U.S. congressional allocation of funds to aid the ROC). He articulated 
that in the case China would not be able to procure a loan from the U.S. government then the 
four wealthiest families in China would be able to provide a loan of up to a billion dollars to the 
GMD in secret.
 41
 In addition, he stated the necessity of the presence of U.S. Navy Task Force 38 
in protecting the cities of Nanking and Shanghai from Communist takeover. At the same time, he 
deemed it unconscionable for U.S. airplanes to use bombs on Chinese Communists in the same 
manner that the United States did on the Japanese during WWII.
42
 Koo likely dismissed the 
enlisting of U.S. airpower, as the effects of it were demoralizing and inhumane. At this point in 
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the Chinese Civil War, the possibility of a coalition government appeared to still be a possibility. 
Thus, national unity was a goal worthy achievable without extreme military action. Unity of the 
nation remained at the forefront of Koo for a Chinese national identity emerging out of chaos. 
 Dr. Koo informed the United States government that there existed two additional 
problems regarding financial and military assistance. The first of which involved the utilization 
of the World Bank. Koo argued that China was a member of the World Bank “on paper only.” 
He reasoned that China was undoubtedly a member, but the funds necessary to participate in the 
organization were not deposited by China but by the United States. As such, China could not 
withdraw funds. This understanding was not known to the United States or the Chinese people.
 43
 
Koo alluded to this unfortunate reality to characterize the grimness of China’s economic 
situation and its dependence on the goodwill and credit of the United States government. The 
second issue which Koo discussed was the way in which China acquired material aid. He argued 
that there was a problematic “bottleneck” forcing the Chinese to purchase supplies from the 
Army Procurement Division instead of through individual manufacturers. By simplifying this 
process, he argued that the Chinese would be able to more efficiently acquire goods. The 
elimination of inefficiency also would continue to conform to American policies regarding 
Chinese affairs. 
 One can summarize Ambassador Koo’s negotiating style as considerably more measured, 
nuanced, and detail oriented that of Madame Chiang. Madame Chiang often came to the United 
States acting as a celebrity. She desired to attract journalistic as well as public attention. Koo, by 
contrast, appeared willing to outline less glamorous aspects of his country’s foreign policy in 
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order to further his specific goals. Koo also was inordinately tactful on this mission, as he 
devised clever and creative solutions to China’s financial woes. At the same time, Koo’s 
willingness to arrive at compromises on financial aid negotiations with the United States 
exemplifies his identity as a Chinese internationalist. This understanding of a Chinese patriot 
with internationalist tendencies draws upon the beliefs of the 19
th
 century intellectual, Yan Fu, 
who argued that Western ideas could be integrated into a Chinese national identity.
44
 
 At a Republican conference in February of 1949, U.S. officials discussed new issues in 
China policy with particular emphasis on aid in light of Chiang Kai-shek’s retirement. 
Congressman Walter Judd (R-Minnesota), who later helped organize the anti-PRC Committee of 
One Million, leaked to ROC officials Secretary Acheson’s comment regarding aid to China as 
ineffective given its lack of a head of state.
45
 This comment reflected two key points on behalf of 
ROC policy. For one, the ROC constantly evaluated and reassessed how sympathetic U.S. 
Secretaries of State would be toward their country. In Acheson’s case, he represented the 
intellectual Democratic political base that opposed McCarthyism and outrageously hawkish 
policies toward the Chinese Communists that were endemic to the Far Right. And secondly, the 
ROC underestimated the international repercussions incurred from Chiang’s resignation as 
president on January 21, 1949.
46
 Chiang Kai-shek resigned due to economic and military chaos 
on the mainland and a personal need to regroup his forces. The reasons behind his resignation 
were not made clear to the Americans. Some U.S. officials such as Acheson assumed that the 
situation in China was deteriorating rapidly with Chiang’s resignation as a precursor to total 
defeat (see the State Department’s China Whitepaper). As such, diplomats like Koo had to 
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increase their efforts abroad to convince U.S. congressmen and others that a Nationalist China 
was not beyond hope.   
 One of the ways in which Nationalist China sympathizers aided in this process was 
through “playing politics.” Congressman Judd blamed President Truman for the present situation 
in China due to the mediation goals of the Marshall Mission.
47
 After the end of World War II, 
Marshall intended to force the Nationalists into a power-sharing agreement with the Communists 
that would effectively end the already long-running Chinese Civil War.
48
 Although, in the end, 
this mission was unsuccessful in brokering a peace, Judd viewed it as a form of communist 
appeasement sanctioned by the President himself. In the middle of a Cold War that was heating 
up, Judd and other congressional Republicans maligned Democrats for being “weak on 
communism” for reasons that would benefit him professionally and would also benefit the 
national interests of Koo and other Nationalist officials.  
 By late spring of 1949, Ambassador Koo continued to work with U.S. officials to 
establish additional financial support for the ROC. As a pretext to this round of negotiations, in 
March the Chinese government had succeeded in persuading the virulently anti-communist U.S. 
Senator McCarran (D-Nevada) to introduce a bill that would appropriate 1.5 billion dollars of aid 
to Nationalist China.
49
 Dean Acheson referenced aspects of this bill in a letter to Senator Tom 
Connally (D-Texas). However, aid figures to which Acheson referred were in places incorrect 
and had a detrimental effect on Chinese political and economic policy. Thus, the ROC 
dispatched Koo to remedy the situation. The ROC instructed Koo to urge “Members of Congress 
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sympathetic towards China,” which included McCarran and others, to repudiate the letter by 
Acheson.
50
 This scenario of a U.S. official quoting incorrect aid figures had several underlying 
effects on Chinese policy. If aid estimates were too high and made public, the American people 
might become opposed to increasing and even maintaining current amounts of financial support 
to China. Conversely, if aid to China was articulated as too low, Americans would be convinced 
that the low level of support was the new standard and would be apprehensive to increase it. Koo 
surreptitiously presented these representatives with the correct aid figures as to avoid further 
embarrassment or confusion.
51
 
New Reports 
About a month later Ambassador Koo met with President Truman to discuss the current 
state of affairs on the Chinese mainland in light of reports of Nationalist losses during major 
battles with the Communists. Koo replied to such reports by arguing that if China were to lose 
additional territory, there existed several lines of defense that incorporated the strategic seaport 
of Guangzhou.
52
 Truman appeared unconvinced by this counterargument. He responded that he 
was disappointed by the developments in China and urged Nationalists leaders to “get together 
and do something.”53 He said that he was even more disappointed by reports that Nationalist 
troops surrendered U.S. provided arms and equipment to enemy forces.
 54
 In light of emerging 
impressions of the Guomindang as corrupt, ineffectual, and dictatorial, it appeared as if the 
Chinese government was rotting from the inside out. Truman closed his castigation of the 
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Nationalists by asserting that the word of the ROC was no good, and that it must be able to 
“prove itself in deeds.”55 According to General Marshall and other emissaries of the United 
States, the Guomindang trafficked in empty promises. This widely embraced impression of the 
GMD by the American government and people created an even more difficult situation for 
Wellington Koo. Not only did he have to contend with difficult financial realities, but he also had 
to combat the growing cynicism of the United States toward genuine political progress in China. 
 Before the meeting with Truman ended, Koo daringly conveyed three requests on behalf 
of his government. First, he stated that the ROC desired for 90 million dollars of China’s balance 
be used to mint silver coinage in the United States. Second, Koo requested a contingent of U.S. 
military advisors to be sent to China to further develop the Nationalist military apparatus. Last, 
Koo asked for U.S. Ambassador to China John L. Stuart to stop in Nationalist controlled Nanjing 
before returning to the United States so as to understand “both sides of the story” in China.56 
These requests on behalf of a clearly failing government appeared to be a desperate effort to 
convince the United States that the reality of Chinese Communists conquering the mainland was 
not taking place. Additionally, these requests demonstrate Ambassador Koo’s agency in his 
attempt to secure the developmental future of the ROC. Ambassador Stuart represented a major 
obstacle in this effort. Days before Koo’s meeting with President Truman, Stuart stated, “I am 
optimistic about the future of China. It seems to me that all Chinese intelligentsia, liberals and 
Christians should support the new regime so that the Chinese Communist authorities may adopt a 
moderate policy.”57 This statement by Stuart conflicted with every goal and ambition of the 
GMD. At this point, U.S. support for the ROC continued to erode at an increasing pace due to 
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the “defection” of U.S. officials to the Communist side. Koo tried to reverse the deterioration of 
the ROC government that to him appeared to be a protector of the true identity of China. 
China White Paper 
In the summer of 1949 the State Department produced a document informally referred to 
as the “White Paper” that critiqued the GMD. In addition, the paper stated that a United States 
military effort to repel communists from the mainland was futile.
58
 The publication of this 
document by the U.S. State Department represented a fundamental shift in policy. Foreshadowed 
previously by statements from Ambassador Stuart, the White Paper exposed the growing power 
and domination of Communist forces over large areas of territory and also partially recognized 
the Communists’ mandate to rule. Wellington Koo responded promptly to this assessment of the 
Chinese Communists. He wrote that the overall strategy of the Communists was rooted in 
discrediting the Nationalists. Therefore, he argued that the publication of the White Paper was 
poorly timed and gave “moral support to the Communists.”59 In this way, Koo tried desperately 
to salvage a rapidly deteriorating ROC foreign policy. He apologized for the situation’s 
deterioration by writing: 
The eight years of war against Japan, the occupation of a substantial portion of the country 
by the enemy, the wanton devastation of practically every phase of national life, and the 
destructive tactics pursued by the Communists to wreck the national economy, were all 
initial handicaps to the Government’s efforts to deal with Communist aggression.60 
He continued by outlining the external factors which predisposed his government to failure to 
consolidate control. These factors included the unfavorable Yalta Agreement that limited China’s 
sovereignty in Manchuria, the arming of Chinese Communists who used Manchuria as a base, as 
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well as the strong influence (material and otherwise) of the Soviet Union.
61
 Koo invoked 
concepts of democracy and antagonism towards tyranny to justify Nationalist policy. He argued 
that the United States and Republic of China shared a common bond regarding holding these 
principles in high esteem, due to their alliance against military aggression in WWII, thus 
utilizing the concept of shared war experience. He not only was able to establish viable reasons 
for China’s faltering status, but he also used pathos to appeal to United States policy makers. 
Broadly speaking, he was able to shift discussion away from the “on the ground activities” of 
Nationalist troops to long-standing ideals regarding a shared mission between the U.S. and China 
to support democracy, anti-imperialism, and freedom from dictatorship. These ideals helped 
construct the Chinese national identity that Koo embodied. Ambassador Koo walked out of the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1919 due to the West’s failure to condemn imperialism outright. Erez 
Manela argues that this “betrayal” at the Paris Peace Conference resulted in “protests and the 
disillusionment of many Chinese with the West.”62  Koo continued to oppose imperialism later in 
his career, which in this instance, became Soviet in character. 
 As the weeks and months dragged on, the Nationalists’ ability to consolidate power in 
any real manner became an even less believable reality. President Truman outlined the most 
recent iteration of United States policy toward the ROC in a statement released in early August. 
He contended that the “mutual interests of the United States and China require full and frank 
discussion of the facts [of China’s political situation].”63 Throughout the statement, Truman 
emphasized the need for openness and truth between the two nations. Truman admitted that the 
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United States “was reluctant to reveal certain facts” about the state of the Nationalist Party for 
fear of hastening the deterioration of the Nationalists’ control of China.64 This reluctance relates 
back to instances of Nationalist officials exaggerating their capabilities in defeating their 
Communist rivals and their trivializing the military potential of the Communists and their 
support from the general populace.  
 Koo responded to Truman’s statement and the White Paper on China several days later. 
He stressed the urgency of China’s political situation by saying, “The house in China is on fire 
and the immediate necessity is to prevent its spread and extinguish it.”65 Following this statement, 
he argued that misinformation and confusion regarding the development of the situation in China 
was held by many nations. Moreover, Koo invoked a Chinese proverb to demonstrate how 
China’s government could learn from past experiences and focus on future development. He 
wished to refute Truman’s subtle critique of Chinese government policy by proclaiming China’s 
dedication to upset the status quo of inefficiency in the name of national progress. It can be 
safely said that stagnation and repetition of failed policies in addition to Truman’s attack on 
China’s inability to be truthful were misperceptions of the Chinese government according to Koo 
and other Nationalists. As such, Koo thought that emphasizing action to extinguish a “burning 
house” was an appropriate method for attracting additional public support from the United States. 
Metaphorically speaking, the fire that is consuming the house of China is communism. Themes 
of communism and its association with fire and destruction were also endemic to culture in the 
United States dating back to 1947, wherein various forms of media portrayed communism as fire 
consuming American ideals and values. In the instance of the publication of the comic book, Is 
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This Tomorrow?, the artist portrays fire as consuming the American flag—the embodiment of 
American ideals such as individuality, freedom, and capitalism. In any case, Koo also praised the 
creation of “new and constructive” American policy toward China’s civil war. New policies from 
the United States not only signified a reevaluation of its own China policy, but also noted the 
precariousness of a stable Chinese government. Stability in this instance is also correlated with 
the shared anti-communist value of freedom. Koo wrote that a “free China is indispensable to a 
free Asia and a free Asia is vital to the existence of a free world.”66 This notion was arguably the 
transcendent argument proliferated by Wellington Koo while conducting diplomacy abroad. If 
communist influence were indeed spreading throughout mainland China, Indochina, and Korea, 
it was laudable vis-à-vis the grand strategy of First World countries to create a dual approach 
towards dealing with communist nations. The first approach was to prevent communist guerilla 
forces from toppling a non-communist regime internally (e.g., aid to Nationalists on the 
mainland). The second arm to this approach was to react to communist offensives with anti-
communist offensives. In this manner anti-communists would utilize adherence to spreading 
democracy, upholding human rights, and ensuring liberty to advance national agendas. Koo 
attempted to reinvigorate China’s dedication to these principles in order to establish closer 
relations with the United States.  
“Hail Mary” and End to the Chinese Civil War 
 Koo had another diplomatic trick at his disposal for winning over U.S. officials and 
members of the American public. He invoked a shared military history during World War II to 
draw parallels between a previous noble fight and a current one. Koo contended that the 
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allegiance between the United States and China was a worthy one—united against a common 
enemy who threatened the peace and well-being of the world. Furthermore, he believed that 
communism in China was akin to “foreign domination.”67 He portrayed Communism in China as 
a non-Chinese, foreign ideology propagated from Moscow. Yet again, Koo equated communism 
with oppression, totalitarianism, and coercion (i.e., anathemas against which China and the 
United States fought in WWII). With combat against these values at the forefront, Koo tried to 
convince Americans that a renewed fight against a common enemy was a worthy cause. He 
appealed to the universality of human characteristics and objectives. Specifically he stated, 
“Chinese people love freedom as intensely as any American and do not wish to live under 
Communist rule…the basic objectives of our two nations are identical.”68  
This statement is in many ways remarkable. For one, given the various racial tensions 
present in the United States during the 1940s, it is a daring move for a Chinese diplomat to 
openly affirm the equality between Chinese and Americans. Additionally, Koo essentially stated 
that a shared effort on behalf of China and the United States could create a better world. Given 
the physical distance between the two countries, different cultures, and an enormous language 
barrier, it is interesting and unexpected that a shared objective emerged. As mentioned, this 
bridging of east and west had early beginnings created during WWII. Koo harkened back to 
these roots in order to establish more familiarity between the United States and China, thereby 
dispelling the application of the concept of Orientalism (i.e., the practice of looking toward Asia 
and its peoples as exotic and/or unknown).
69
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 On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China. As the Nationalist war time capital of Nanjing had been under the control of the 
Communists since April, the Nationalists had since moved central operations to the city of 
Guangzhou. Newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs George Yeh reflected upon the greater 
significance of Mao’s declaration in a telegram sent out of Guangzhou to Koo. In the message he 
linked Mao’s victory with Soviet intervention and allegiance to a “bogus regime set up in 
Peiping.”70 He argued that the key to Mao’s success was not a shift in consciousness on behalf of 
the Chinese people, but instead was an unprecedented interference in Chinese affairs from the 
world’s largest communist state. He also viewed the Soviet Union’s disrespect for China’s 
sovereignty as an issue dating back to the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and 
Alliance in 1945. This treaty recognized the de jure independence of Mongolia and established a 
strengthened trading agreement between the two countries in the aftermath of WWII.
71
 But most 
importantly, the Soviet Union recognized Nationalist China as the one and only legitimate 
government of China.
72
 Yeh implied that the Soviet regime was evil, untrustworthy, and 
willingly defying international law. As such, he delegitimized the newly established regime 
under Mao that was allegedly so closely affiliated with the USSR. Yeh concluded his tirade 
against the Soviet Union by extrapolating future consequences in allying one’s nation with the 
Soviets. Yeh wrote to Koo: 
[The] Chinese Government in concluding [the] 1945 Treaty hoped [that a] foundation of 
peace and security in [the] Far East would be laid. For this reason China had always 
observed all her obligations therefrom in spite of repeated Soviet violations. Recognition 
of [the] puppet regime by [the] Soviet Union therefore [is] a threat to peace and security 
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in [the] Far East. [The] Chinese Government [sic] viewing with disregard by Soviet 
Union for [the] sanctity of [its] treaty obligation has decided to sever diplomatic relation 
with [the] Soviet Union and take step[s] to recall its diplomatic mission and consular 
posts in [the] Soviet Union.
73
 
 
The implications of this quotation are multifaceted regarding the future of diplomacy between 
the Republic of China and communist nations. The failure of the Soviet Union to abide by the 
1945 Sino-Soviet treaty foreshadowed the skepticism expressed by Nationalist Chinese towards 
peace negotiations with the Soviet Union and its satellites during the Korean War. In addition, 
this treachery mirrored the activities of the Soviets in Eastern Europe, wherein the USSR 
occupied formerly free nations and created the Iron Curtain. Yeh believed that it was a waste of 
the ROC’s material and moral efforts by attempting to seek diplomatic solutions with the USSR. 
Likewise, ROC diplomats did not fulfill the previous requests by General Marshall and Truman 
in seeking to create a bilateral government prior to 1949. On one hand, the avoidance of sharing 
power with the Chinese Communists indicated an ROC government that sought power above all 
else. Yet—Koo, Yeh, and Chiang were convinced and tried to convince others that any type of 
power structure shared with the Communists would collapse due to either Soviet meddling or 
outright Communist betrayal. Thus, we see Yeh directly attacking the Soviet Union in a similar 
manner in which he condemned Mao’s faction. Though perhaps contrary to our understanding of 
diplomats, Yeh and Koo undoubtedly represented the ROC hardline stance against Soviet Union 
international influence. 
 Koo articulated this type of hardline stance against Soviet territorial encroachment in a 
letter to presumably U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson. He quoted government policy toward 
Taiwan in saying that “The National Government will spare no effort to preserve Taiwan as a 
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central base of operations against Communist aggression.”74 At this moment in time Koo and the 
Nationalists wanted to reaffirm two issues with the United States. To begin with, they wanted to 
characterize Taiwan as a base that still housed a powerful military that could defend against an 
attack from the Communists. Secondly, the base concept served as a message to the United 
States’ military that they were welcome to station there in order to implement the practical side 
of the Truman Doctrine. In this sense territorial encroachment by Chinese Communists and 
Soviets was viewed as synonymous as they were both part of a larger international communist 
bloc based out of Moscow (according to Koo and others). This “base” analogy also served to 
represent a less tangible, ideological base. Koo once again quoted his government in writing:  
[We] will urge the Provincial Government of Taiwan, following the principle of full 
cooperation between the provincial authorities and the people, to assert its utmost efforts 
for political and economic progress of the Province in order that the people of the island 
may enjoy a democratic and stable life, thereby establishing a marked contrast to the 
enslavement and miserable conditions obtaining in the communist-controlled areas on 
the mainland and thus serving to strengthen the will of the Chinese people in opposing 
Communism.
75
 
 
The implication conveyed by this quotation from the ROC is self-evident. If the Nationalist 
government were able to show the world that the condition of their people was improving, they 
would be able to present empirical evidence of communism’s failure to live up to its expectation 
in countries where it was implemented. Moreover, the ROC promised its people stability. It 
could use this promise to moderate the relative amount of democracy in the country by 
increasing Guomindang control, discouraging mass demonstrations, and censoring media. In this 
way the Guomindang could create a dual approach of invoking democratic ideals for foreign aid, 
yet justify delaying the practice of true democracy due to internal threats to peace and stability. 
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 The developments from 1946-1949 provided a diplomatic framework in which 
Ambassador Koo could work to facilitate aid to the ROC to ensure victory over the Chinese 
Communists. 1946-1949 also signified a period of introspection for the ROC regarding its place 
in international politics after it lost control of the Chinese mainland in late 1949. This period 
would mark the beginning of the creation of a new ROC identity influenced in large part by 
moral and financial assistance from the United States. The upcoming Korean War beginning in 
1950 served as a turning point that allowed the ROC to regroup. Moreover, South Korea would 
represent a country embroiled in the same Cold War politics that would affect the ROC. 
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The Korean War and its Relevance (1950-1953) 
 
 The years from 1950-1953 were yet another period of upheaval. This period was 
characterized by a reduced ROC transitioning to building regional and global alliances for the 
sake of its survival. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 not only served as a critical event 
that allowed the ROC to gain additional U.S. support, but also as a deterministic war regarding 
the future implications of the Cold War for China. By serving as an intermediary between the 
ROC and the U.S.A., Wellington Koo used the “Domino Theory” to justify lobbying for 
increased financial and moral support. Ambassador Koo made important progress in the field 
during this period after WWII. In particular, Koo attacked the growing threat of international 
communism that he viewed as an affront to human dignity and freedom. He argued that 
communism on the Chinese mainland and in other parts of the world were puppets of Moscow. 
In the Chinese context, he argued that communism eroded Chinese culture and destroyed the 
family unit.
76
 This section will chronicle how Koo’s efforts during the Korean War influenced 
the decisions of the “democratic powers” of Taiwan and the United States regarding the crisis in 
the diplomatic sphere. Ambassador Koo’s diplomatic approach during the Korean War and the 
war itself resulted in the transformation of the ROC’s national identity from a state struggling for 
survival to a country with international goals in opposition to communist advances.  
 
                                                          
76
 Longines Chronoscope , May 26, 1955. 
 39 
 
In the year after the conclusion of WWII, the international community attempted to 
determine the best outcome for countries previously ruled by Axis powers. We can see a case of 
this geo-political restructuring in the suggestion to create a “trusteeship” in Korea during 
December 1945.
77
 The conversations and debated political solutions that took place during and 
after this assembly laid that groundwork for future contention and conflict leading up to the 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The following year the suggestion of managing Korea by 
foreign powers continued to be debated. Then Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that 
the American-Soviet Commission would determine the necessity of a multilateral trusteeship. 
Koo asked what the USSR’s attitude was towards this type of governance, and followed this 
question by saying that the ROC disapproved of the trusteeship since it would “greatly 
complicate the Korean situation.”78 It seems obvious that Koo was wary of the intentions of the 
Soviets after witnessing their support of the enemy Chinese Communists with which his 
government continued to fight a protracted civil war. On November 5, 1947, Koo sent a telegram 
to his government’s foreign minister Wang Shih-chieh in Nanjing informing him of the progress 
of an international commission to determine the status of Korea. He discussed various aspects of 
the proposal from the United States, his government, as well as the French, but paid particular 
attention to the so-called Philippine amendment. This amendment stated that members of the 
United Nations should refrain from intervening in the affairs of Korea unless they proceed 
through the UN General Assembly. Koo followed this explanation of the amendment with a 
statement that the “independence and sovereignty” of the Korean people must serve as the goal.79         
 This telegram serves as a means to view the entangling effect of diplomacy after the rise 
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of new countries in the aftermath of World War II and in the deeply layered bureaucracy of the 
United Nations (UN). However, the meaning of Koo’s telegram is more significant than would 
first appear. Koo was no doubt aware of the way in which the Soviet Union immediately 
mobilized to control Poland after the conclusion of the war on the Eastern front in WWII. As 
such, he likely feared a repetition of this type of event in Northeast Asia, which could have 
further destabilized the already tenuously established Chinese government.  Koo employed the 
use of the words “independence” and “sovereignty” to warn other nations—especially those 
advancing imperialistic tendencies of communism—that Korea’s self-determination would not 
be squelched by “all acts derogatory to [it].”80 These concepts of sovereignty and independence 
reflected central tenets of President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, wherein he articulated 
the importance of “affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity 
to great and small nations alike.”81 This ideal paralleled the national identity that Koo aspired to 
achieve. Since the Republic of Korea (ROK) began to develop as a country in a manner similar 
to ROC, it sought goals similar to Koo’s conception of nationhood. 
The notion that a commission would be able to resolve the status of Korea dissolved over 
time. Diplomat G. H. Wang represented China at the UN General Assembly and later at the UN 
Temporary Commission on Korea. In a letter to Koo, he outlined a series of points on 
developments in Korea. He wrote that, “North Korea, at least for the time being, is inaccessible 
to the commission.”82 This inaccessibility to the commission was in no doubt attributed to the 
Soviet Union’s policies and directives. Building on this reality, Wang reported to Koo that 
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“inability of the Korean political parties to get together places an equally difficult obstacle…as 
that of the negative attitude of USSR.”83 Factionalism along political lines became a pretense for 
future conflict on the Korean Peninsula regarding communist leaning and non-communist 
alliances. Wang also indicated that political polls in the South signified overwhelming support of 
Rightists led by Syngman Rhee.
84
 As to be expected, this group formed an anti-communist 
coalition that had to be contended with. Wang ended his letter to Koo by simply saying that the 
Chinese request for additional documents on the Korean question would be consolidated and 
distributed to the permanent Chinese delegation.
85
 
On June 25, 1950, the Korean War erupted. North Korean (the country will also be 
referred to as Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) forces led by Kim Il-sung 
crossed the 38
th
 parallel and stormed into South Korea. In the days following this invasion, the 
diplomatic bureaucracy of the United States mobilized to address the various issues emerging. 
On June 29, Livingston Merchant, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
Affairs, met with Ambassador Koo in the absence of Dean Rusk. The ambassador stated that his 
government was “prepared to afford military assistance to the best of their ability in Korea.”86 
This statement on behalf of the ambassador outlines a clear policy established by the ROC 
towards Korea. Koo spoke realistically of military aid in saying that China could not afford to 
send naval or air force units, but was “prepared to furnish one army of approximately 33,000 
men composed of three divisions with the best field equipment available to the Chinese.”87 The 
reasons behind Koo’s policy statement of proposing to assist the United States are quite clear. At 
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this point in time, the ROC had entirely lost control of mainland China approximately a year 
before this crisis in Korea. As such, the Nationalists desired to prevent further communist 
encroachment into the Asian continent. 
 It can be argued that this way of strategic political thinking was mirrored in the U.S. 
context by President Truman’s reaction to the North Korean invasion. Truman reacted viscerally 
to the advances from Kim Il-sung in declaring, “By God, I’m going to let them [North Korea] 
have it!” 88 He chose not ask for a declaration of war from Congress, and instead sent General 
Douglass MacArthur to repel the invaders. Thus, Taiwan and the United States embraced the 
tenants of the Truman Doctrine. Several years earlier in March of 1947, Truman articulated his 
beliefs that the United States has a duty to protect free peoples from communist domination.
89
 
His allusion to subjugation and outside pressures both became known as references to the Soviet 
Union and its influences. The leader of the Nationalists, Chiang Kai-shek and his diplomatic 
corps without a doubt were involved in this process of resisting communist encroachment as the 
Korean War commenced. 
In the days following the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula, Dr. Koo worked 
further to relay critical diplomatic messages. On June 30, 1950, Koo sent a secret memorandum 
to the foreign ministry in Taibei, which transmitted information from the aide-memoire (i.e., a 
type of informal diplomatic document) about military assistance to Korea presented to the State 
Department. He wrote that not only could aid in the form of 33,000 troops be provided, but the 
ROC could also provide 20 air transports with suitable protection from enemy aircrafts. 
Additionally, he stated that if troops were transported by sea, they could be protected by a 
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Chinese “naval escort.” Koo concluded his telegram with a fourth point saying Chinese troops 
could be ready in five days’ time. 90 This exchange signified an overwhelming willingness on 
behalf of the ROC to assist the anti-communist war effort by whatever means necessary. 
Furthermore, the ROC’s giving exact numbers for troop and carrier estimates to the U.S. 
government indicated a clear military buildup (or at least the ability to do so). Beyond projecting 
an image of having “troops to spare,” the ROC wanted to appear flexible in the methods by 
which they could help the United States and United Nations. 
Ideological Battles 
 The larger purpose for the ROC’s agreement to send troops to Korea was to take sides in 
a battle of ideology. On the day the aide-memoire for Chinese military assistance was presented 
to the State Department, Dr. Koo said to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson that President 
Truman’s recent statement was a “magnificent stand taken against Communist aggression.”91 
Koo’s declaration against communism reflected the general feelings of Chiang’s government. 
While speaking with Koo, Johnson added that he appreciated the aid offered by Koo’s 
government, but believed U.S. infantry would be the first troops on the ground in Korea.
92
 
Johnson added that because the United Nations was the legal organizer of troops, it was in Koo’s 
interests to discuss troop possibilities with the U.N. administrative body and the Supreme 
Commander of the UN troops (MacArthur) in place of the United States.
93
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This conversation between statesmen revealed two important points. To begin, Johnson’s 
referral of Koo to the United Nations demonstrated a multilateral effort against countries 
perpetrating military aggression (i.e., committing acts in violation of the U.N. Charter). The 
United Nations in the scenario of war in Korea exemplified an international body of laws and 
guidelines by which all member states must abide. Beyond international laws that regulate how 
countries interact with each other, the U.N. also represents high ideals with respect to human 
rights. The Soviet Union and North Korea were political entities that clearly violated both 
general international laws about respecting territorial sovereignty and those concerning human 
rights in their spheres of influence. By joining the U.N. alliance against communist forces, the 
ROC would champion itself as another member of the international community fighting against 
oppression, censorship, militarism, etc. Although not necessarily articulated in a direct manner, 
the Nationalists wanted to maintain international order and stability to further its own interests 
and cripple communist nations’ expansions. 
Anti-communist Alliance 
Though the Korean War was underway by July 1950, other related international issues 
regarding communist encroachment emerged. Fulton Freeman (from the U.S. Division of 
Chinese Affairs), Wellington Koo, and Dean Rusk met in Washington to determine how the 
Korean question affected other areas in the world. Rusk argued that the overall strategy of the 
communists in Asia was not obvious, but that they could be planning future advances.
94
 This 
suspicion by Rusk reflected a general paranoia about the intentions and goals of the Soviet Union 
following World War II. This suspicion was also a central part of the prevailing Domino Theory 
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in the 1950s, which stipulated that if one nation fell to communism others nearby would fall in 
quick succession. The Truman Doctrine in tandem with other grand strategies attempted to block 
this advancement at every opportunity possible. Thus, Rusk pointed out to Koo that some people 
raised the question as to whether Taiwan could defend itself against an “all-out Communist 
attack” while lending troops to the Korean Peninsula. Ambassador Koo agreed with Rusk and 
stated that there were reports of military movements in Manchuria, Hong Kong, and Indochina.
95
  
About a week prior to this meeting in Washington, Truman ordered the U.S. 7
th
 Fleet to 
occupy the Taiwan Strait to neutralize the area from an invasion by either side.
96
 Koo followed 
this report by emphasizing the critical nature of establishing a “satisfactory liaison between the 
U.S. 7
th
 Fleet and the Chinese authorities on Formosa as soon as possible.”97 In this way, the 
Nationalists wanted to establish communication with the U.S. Fleet in order to ensure their 
political and territorial stability. By establishing additional communication and diplomatic 
relations with the military of the United States, Koo’s government further distanced themselves 
from the Communists and their spheres of influence. On the note of strategy and alliances, Koo 
inquired about simultaneous troop movements on behalf of the Soviets in “Iranian, Turkish or 
Yugoslav border areas…similar to Korea.” Rusk replied that in spite of constant monitoring, 
intelligence had discovered no unusual offensive tactics.
 98
 
 The effects of the Korean Crisis appeared more impactful than would first meet the eye. 
Secretary of State Dulles and Dr. Koo discussed the merits and demerits of establishing an anti-
communist alliance in the Pacific. Although Dulles asserted that an Asian military pact would 
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cause more harm than good due to increased factionalism in the world, Koo offered a differing 
opinion. He argued that a pact starting with “Japan, Korea, China, and the Philippines” would be 
like-minded in their goals since they were more “exposed to the Communist menace.”99 Koo 
believed that these countries were places in which the Soviets and Chinese Communists were 
interested for strategic among other reasons. He also believed that communist nations had wide-
ranging international goals, rather than purely adopting the “communism in one country” 
ideology. Koo alluded to the potential of international communism in asking Dulles if he thought 
a third world war would develop out of the Korean War. 
100
 Dulles replied that the answer to this 
question depends solely on Moscow’s policy.101 This reply reflects the self-determined nature of 
the United States and its assurance that its policies uphold worthwhile, democratic principles. At 
the same time, it suggests that the United States would not act as an aggressor regarding an 
expansion of the scope of war in Korea.  
 The coordination of communist nations during the war can be seen in Dulles’s view about 
sending ground troops into Korea. He argued that the supply line of soldiers into North Korea 
from China and the Soviet Union was well-established. In speaking with Koo, Dulles said that 
“For every Communist soldier killed by the American forces, two Communists would turn up to 
carry on the fight.”102 Koo thought the best response to overwhelming communist show of force 
was an equally powerful counter offensive composed of “the combined man-power resources of 
all free countries in Asia and United Nations.”103 Koo further emphasized this notion of unified 
force in speaking with General MacArthur. He argued the case to MacArthur that American 
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troops were indeed critical to the positive outcome of the Korean War, but were unfamiliar with 
much of Asian territory. Thus, it would be in MacArthur’s interest to enlist the help of 
Nationalist troops. 
104
 Koo also alluded to Chiang Kai-shek’s vast experience in dealing with 
communist forces on mainland China. MacArthur rejected troops from the ROC on the grounds 
that the defense of Taiwan was a higher priority. Additionally, he believed that it would not only 
take too long to equip and transport said troops, but also that the war would likely be over very 
soon.
105
 In spite of MacArthur’s rejection of Nationalist troops, Koo redoubled his efforts in 
establishing unity against communist encroachment. He suggested that the United Nations ought 
to be the avenue through which there could be a “fundamental solution to the Korean problem.” 
However, he acknowledged that a sovereign Korea was not likely due to Soviet obstruction.
 106
 
Koo told MacArthur that the General Assembly of the United Nations must pass resolutions 
ensuring a “free and independent” Korea, due to the reality that a divided Korea would be prone 
to war again in the future. Although not articulated explicitly, Koo understood that efforts 
through the U.N. Security Council would fail because of the Soviet Union’s veto power.  
 As the war continued, potential resolutions with the communists began to emerge. ROC 
Foreign Minister George Yeh wrote Koo warning that delaying a decision regarding a war 
agreement would “disappoint [the] government of victimized men engaged in actual fighting and 
[would] give aggressors fresh opportunity to attack.”107 He followed this declaration in writing, 
“Communist aggression [is] not merely directed against Korea but [the] UN itself.”108 In this 
way, there existed a fundamental distrust of any agreements with communist nations. This 
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distrust was more than likely mutual from the perspective of the Communists. The uneasiness 
experienced by communists and non-communists made adopting a cease-fire agreement 
considerably more difficult. Minister Yeh reflected his government’s feelings in writing that the 
present resolution “on the table” did not call the communist forces aggressors. He said that the 
government of the ROC thought that “all measures” must be taken in order to punish the 
communist aggressors in accordance with the U.N. Charter.
109
 This assertion clearly indicated a 
breakdown in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and 
North Korea by the ROC. At this point in the war, meaningful communication to these three 
countries from the perspective of the ROC only occurred through the United States State 
Department acting as an intermediary.  
An example of this type of diplomacy occurring is seen in a meeting between Koo, Dean 
Rusk, and the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs O. Edmund Clubb. Ambassador Koo 
argued before these two U.S. officials that the counter proposals offered by Beijing were, in 
effect, rejections of cease-fire proposals. Koo believed that the only reasonable next step was to 
find the Communists guilty of aggression.
110
 This view by Koo to an extent epitomizes national 
interests and Taiwanese politics rather than creating/sustaining peace in the Pacific. All the while, 
Koo attempted to justify his stance by thinking of “the situation in that area as one where the 
questions of Korea and Formosa were allied.”111 This understanding of the region was central to 
U.S. policy as well. In line with the Domino Theory, the United States believed that the Asian 
region was particularly fragile to communist advances, and its overall defense required anti-
communist military presence stationed in many places simultaneously. 
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Britain, Turkey, and Japan 
  By 1952, numerous developments had complicated the Korean situation. Two years 
earlier, India, Indonesia, Great Britain and eight other countries recognized the People’s 
Republic of China as the true government of China.
112
 And by 1952, the war effort became 
thoroughly stalemated due to the full scale intervention of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 
This stalemate in light of British recognition of the PRC, as well as the fact that they were 
fighting on the side of the United Nations presented an awkward diplomatic situation. In a 
meeting with Secretary Dulles, Koo critiqued the British stance by saying, “[I] cannot understand 
why Churchill failed to realize that the policy of recognizing Communist China had brought 
nothing to Great Britain.”113 Dulles replied that the British had “pinned their hope on the future 
of Communist China, whereas Nationalist China, in their view, had no future at all.”114 This 
comment in no doubt infuriated Ambassador Koo. In this case, Britain appeared to abandon the 
very country that promoted its interests of freedom and democracy the most. Taiwan strove to 
project an image of itself that was the antithesis of communism as seen in places like the Soviet 
bloc and the PRC. 
 It is clear that Koo and Taiwan’s government would not interact with countries like 
Great Britain that seemed to value more highly such attributes as territory (Hong Kong in the 
case of Great Britain), trade potential, and regional hegemony over other high-minded ideals. 
Koo personally detested many of the diplomatic policies from Europe likely due to the way in 
which he was treated during the Paris Peace Conference and during his tenure as Chinese 
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ambassador to Britain and France. He once remarked that he rejected the “Churchillian view of 
Europe being the center of gravity.”115 In particular, Koo believed that the United States should 
formulate its policies about the containment of the communist threat separately from Europe. 
 In the following months, logistical matters emerged that further emphasized the political 
differences between U.N. forces and their communist enemies. While speaking with Turkish 
Ambassador Feridun Erkin, Koo discussed the details of a possible all-encompassing truce 
proposal that was revealed in the Chicago Sun slightly before their meeting.
116
 The proposal 
suggested a return of two-fifths of the total prisoners of war held by the Americans and their 
allies. Koo stated that the reasoning behind this part of the proposal was to alleviate the “vexing 
problem of keeping those Communist prisoners who refused to be repatriated.”117 It is unclear 
how widespread the problem of keeping North Koreans prisoner was. All the while, Koo and 
other diplomats thought it was a central concession worth including in the overall truce proposal 
as a place from which a peaceable resolution could be implemented. With respect to the true 
source of diplomatic power on the side of the communists, Koo firmly believed that the leader 
behind communist negotiations was the Kremlin.
118
 In his view, at that point in time, the Soviets 
did not want an immediate truce to the conflict. Koo argued that Moscow synced their 
negotiations with the political developments in the United States. Koo thought that if the United 
States elected a Republican president, the Soviets would immediately call to negotiate a truce.
119
 
The reasoning behind the way of thinking of the Soviets is fairly straightforward. They 
understood the traditionally hawkish policies of Republicans toward war and especially 
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regarding communist containment/suppression. Certain conservative military men like General 
MacArthur had the fullest intention of expanding the war by either bombing Manchuria, 
blockading the coast of the PRC, or engaging in a direct war with the Soviet Union.
120
  
 An overriding diplomatic concern of the Taiwanese, United States, and other nations was 
the possible motives and potential territorial acquisitions of communist nations. The Japanese 
Ambassador to the U.S., Mr. Araki, was in agreement with Koo apropos of communist 
motivations for expanded control on a global scale. Araki used the analogy of a pole to show 
communist dangers in Europe were akin to those in Asia.
121
 Koo said that the issue of communist 
expansion must be stopped by “front lines” in certain regions. For example, he said that Taiwan 
and Japan served as blocks against the communists in Asia. The Japanese Ambassador noted that 
his country was already thoroughly involved in the Korean War, since North Korean ships were 
intercepting U.N. supplies in the waters near Japan. Koo acknowledged that this type of situation 
existed in saying that the communists were “masters in infiltration and sabotage.”122 
Pessimism 
By February 3, 1953, pessimism continued as the prevailing attitude of the ROC 
regarding a peaceful resolution to the Korean conflict. The Sinoembassy, (i.e., Chinese 
diplomatic enclave in Washington, D.C.) headed by Koo, cabled a telegram to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Taiwan describing their view of the current situation. The telegram indicated 
that the communists had consistently rejected pro-armistice proposals and that the Chinese 
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Communists were clearly joined with the USSR.
123
 The embassy also emphasized the purported 
fact that there was no longer any “logic or sense” that guided negotiations.124 As such, they said 
that they must now rely on the U.S. 7
th
 fleet in the strait of Taiwan to mitigate any possible 
military attacks. The correspondence between the Chinese embassy and Taiwan’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs signified not only a deep distain for the Chinese communist’s policy, but also a 
tacit refusal to acknowledge the Chinese on the mainland as representing any aspect of China by 
linking their diplomacy directly to the Soviet Union.  
 In May 1953, various U.S. and Chinese officials began to question the Soviet Union’s 
“peace offensive” that appeared to be a reversal from previous diplomatic practices. One of these 
individuals who questioned this tactic most readily was none other than President Eisenhower. In 
a reply to a letter relayed by Koo from Chiang Kai-shek, he stated that it would be wrong to 
believe that the overall objectives of the USSR have changed in spite of their willingness to 
negotiate in recent weeks.
125
 This view by Eisenhower reflects the natural suspicion by First 
World nations of the ambitions of the Kremlin during the Cold War. For the duration of the 
Korean War, negotiations regarding peaceable solutions to the conflict were ongoing, tedious, 
and wrought with problems. The central reasoning behind this complication relates back to the 
notion that diplomacy was particularly layered and multilateral due to Korean wartime alliances 
that mirrored Cold War political doctrines. Eisenhower thought that “world enslavement” was 
the single most important international goal of the Soviet Union, and that it was the United 
States’ duty to prevent it coming to fruition.126 Thus, perhaps Eisenhower viewed it as a wise 
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policy maneuver to reject the USSR’s “peace offensive” on the basis that it only resulted in 
“endless negotiation which may be used merely as a vehicle for Communist propaganda.”127 In 
this letter to Chiang, Eisenhower presented a general outline of a plan that would be the 
necessary conditions for peace in Korea. One general condition for peace involved the demand 
that Soviet leadership adopt a new way of viewing the world politically. This demand follows the 
conquest of Poland and other nations in Eastern Europe after the resolution to the European 
conflict in World War II.  Moreover, this demand on behalf of the U.S. President also emerged 
with the purpose of allaying uncertainty regarding the futures of new, less powerful and 
influential nation states. The second more specific demand insisted on the conducting of free 
elections after the successful implementation of an armistice.
128
 Tenants of Woodrow Wilson’s 
understanding of democracy stipulated that it was the duty of the United States to “export 
democracy” to other nations in the world.  Although this concept arose decades before 
Eisenhower became president, it nonetheless was relevant to the self-determination of nations in 
the face of communist advance during the 1950s.  
The Foreign Affairs Ministry in Taibei viewed the conflict in somewhat different terms 
determined through the lens of prisoner of war (POW) repatriation. POW were indeed people 
who were involved in the overall diplomatic struggle during the unfolding of the conflict in 
Korea. Unlike in 1950 or 1951, by May 1953 involved nations began to view the issue in more 
formal ways. At this point in the war, many believed that the best method of resolving the 
problem of POW who refused to be repatriated was to utilize an independent commission. Taibei 
viciously attacked the commission by arguing that due to the scale of the conflict, no member of 
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the United Nations could truly be determined as neutral. Furthermore, Taibei asserted that two of 
the members of the commission were satellites of the Soviet Union.
 129
 As such, they informed 
Koo that the overall concept of a neutral commission was in jeopardy. This example brings to 
light an important, yet infrequently discussed aspect of the war regarding neutrality. Since this 
war was essentially an outlet for Cold War tensions and hostilities, even diplomats who 
championed peace and stability had to assume often hostile political positions of their respective 
governments. Moreover, resolution of conflict and de-escalation of tensions appeared to be a 
fleeting reality vis-à-vis the division of the world among communist and non-communist lines. 
With respect to political tensions, anti-communist feelings strengthened by June 1953. In 
a conversation with the U.S. State Department official Karl Rankin, Dr. Koo learned that Rankin 
advocated increased military aid for Taiwan in terms of sustaining or increasing the current 
annual allocation of 300 million dollars.
130
 Rankin believed that even if an armistice could be 
passed, Taiwan nonetheless faced imminent threats from many fronts. This political uncertainty 
undoubtedly was tied to communist aggression in Korea, but also might be partially attributed to 
instability in French Indochina. Rankin and other U.S. officials believed that a strong militarily 
defensive policy that supported allied nations could best protect against communist incursions. 
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Syngman Rhee 
Syngman Rhee, the President of South Korea, assumed a much stronger and more direct 
anti-communist policy than most of Europe. In the midst of peace negotiations, Rhee attempted 
to force U.N. and U.S. troops to continue to engage the communists in combat. Taibei’s foreign 
minister Yeh wrote to Koo informing him that the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) policies of 
persistent and prolonged engagement were “disastrous for Korea.”131 Due to this renewed onset 
of aggression against the wishes of the United States and U.N., the situation in Korea appeared 
dire. Yeh speculated that if the U.S. and U.N. forces were compelled to withdraw from the 
Korean Peninsula, it might result in a massive political and military catastrophe. In addition, Yeh 
stated that the onset of new conflict would require a recalibration of “U.S.-Taiwan Policy.” 132 
The reasons for a reexamination of policy were several. To begin, Rhee’s flippant disregard for 
the well-being of U.S./U.N. troops as well as a refusal to accept a peace agreement due to 
personal political ambitions jeopardized regional stability. Moreover, by this point in the war, 
anti-communists generally wanted to end the conflict while simultaneously suppressing the 
communist advance. Rhee’s policies reflected aggressive tendencies that were in some ways 
imperialistic in nature (i.e., conquering additional territory on The Peninsula). Taiwan believed 
that the U.S. and other allies were increasingly becoming embroiled in a national conflict that 
had renewed with different goals from those of the international community.  
 Utilization of the notion of a unified Chinese diaspora was also an important concept 
during the Korean War. The Nationalist government attempted to match up its own political 
interests with the thoughts and desires of Chinese in places like Korea. Taiwan offered to grant 
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asylum to anti-communist Chinese POW from the PRC. In September 1953, a mass rally was 
held by various civic organizations to voice Taiwan’s support for Chinese who declared 
themselves opposed to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime.
133
 The motives behind the 
rally and Taiwan’s support are three-fold. To begin, Taiwan desired to repatriate former 
countrymen in order to build up national sentiment that was directed in favor of enemies of 
communism. Secondly, Taibei believed that by serving as a safe-haven for anti-communist POW, 
the nation would serve as shining example of hope against global communist encroachment. 
Lastly and perhaps most importantly, Taiwan could serve as a place for rehabilitation to protect 
against the “physical and mental threats of Chinese Communists working on them.”134 The 
Taiwanese government informed Ambassador Koo that a dual approach of Chinese working 
together from Taiwan and overseas must be instituted to guard against internal and external 
“treachery of Chinese Communists.”135 Though some left-leaning officials may have believed 
that this approach was based on paranoia, Nationalists acknowledged the ever-present threat 
communism had on their society. As such, Taiwan framed the issue of communist advance as an 
affront to Chinese culture and civilization, and required a defensive alliance of Chinese all 
throughout the world to prevent its destruction of Chinese values. This allegiance towards the 
ROC succeeded with overseas Chinese in the case of Singapore and other Chinese diaspora.
136
 
In the final months of the war, anti-communist doctrine remained stronger than ever. 
Syngman Rhee continued to meet with Chiang Kai-shek and appeared ready to renew offensives 
into North Korean territory. All the while, one of the more pressing issues was the thought of 
                                                          
133
 Chinese Embassy, Washington D.C. Incoming Telegram, September 29, 1953, Koo Papers, 1. 
134
 Ibid., 2. 
135
 Ibid., 3. 
136
 Yu-San Wang, Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan: An Unorthodox Approach 
(Westport: Praeger, 1990), 93-95. 
 57 
 
creating a vast Asian alliance similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Much 
like the purpose of NATO, this alliance would serve as a “defensive wall” against the Asian 
communist bloc. As Presidents Rhee and Chiang both possessed the largest amount of anti-
communist troops in Asia with a combined total of 1.2 million, it seemed reasonable why these 
were the two nations that yearned to expand their influence throughout Asia. This alliance would 
undoubtedly play an integral role in the grand strategy of a multilateral “struggle against 
communism.”137 
 Ambassador Koo pointed out to Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson that this 
type of pact could only be created and overseen by Asian peoples, since many people in Asia 
were suspicious of underlying colonialist tendencies of Westerners.
138
 Unsurprisingly, this 
understanding of “Asia for Asians” played an integral role in influencing the motivations of 
statesmen like Rhee, who disregarded Western policies of peaceable resolution to the Korean 
War in favor of his own understanding of what furthered Korean national interests. Additionally, 
this alliance of anti-communist Asian countries would constitute a compilation of Asian reasons 
for opposing communism that was distinctly different from those of the United States or Western 
Europe. Koo argued that if a country like the Philippines was the chief supporter of an Asian-
Pacific pact, it would be well received in the United States due to the popularity of the Filipino 
President Magsaysay.
139
 It is not entirely clear why Koo believed this reception would be the 
case, but we can speculate that it is due to the Philippines’ distance from the entangling and 
politically divisive matters of Taiwanese aid and the Korean War. Although a large-scale alliance 
of this kind never came into existence during or after the Korean War, it nevertheless represented 
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the goals and ambitions of stridently anti-communist statesmen, who attempted to enlist support 
at every opportunity to prevent communist advances. Koo’s version of Chinese national identity 
diametrically opposed communism. Like other viewpoints within the GMD, Koo equated 
communism with Soviet imperialism.
140
  
The Korean War “ended” on July 27, 1953, through a ceasefire negotiated between the 
United Nations Command (mainly South Korea and the United States) on one side and the 
Chinese and North Korean Communists on the other.
141
 This agreement provided peace, but not 
an official end to the war. In particular, the document provided “an exchange of prisoners, 
establishment of a neutral zone for the cease-fire and a later political conference that would 
attempt to settle the tragic Korean questions.”142 At the later political conference, the 1954 
Geneva Conference, the participating nations failed to come to an agreement about the political 
status of Korea.
143
  As the ROC was not present at the armistice signing or Geneva (as the United 
States did not wish to increase tensions with the PRC), Koo’s opinions regarding the future of 
the Korean situation were only academic in nature. All the while, U.S. General Smith argued that 
the conference partially succeeded due to the U.S. “maintain[ing] good relations with the ROK 
[and] demonstrating that the failure to reach an agreement was the fault of the Soviets.”144 This 
statement exemplifies how Koo’s anti-communist feelings and his understanding of a modern 
state remained aligned with United States foreign policy. 
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The Korean War further cultivated ROC national identity through its moral support of the 
United Nations’ forces.  Wellington Koo served as an intermediary between the ROC and United 
States in relaying understandings of wartime developments between the United States and 
Republic of China. This period showed that Koo remained willing to negotiate with the United 
States instead of Europe due to Europe’s “soft-stance” toward communism. Additionally, the 
ROC in its reduced state also remained a crucial part of grand strategy in the Pacific. From 1953 
until Koo’s retirement in 1956, the ROC adapted to its lessened territory on Taiwan by ensuring 
the island’s defense and sovereignty in the South China Sea. In short, the ROC began to develop 
in a manner paralleling that of its compatriot, South Korea. The ROC and ROK emerged from 
the Korean War with similar national identities defined by: anti-communist political doctrines, 
unquestioning allegiance to the United States, and the de jure embrace of Western principles of 
democracy and self-determination.  
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ROC Foreign Policy in the Aftermath (1953-1956) 
 
The period of 1953-1956 marked a transition from an ROC in flux to an ROC returning 
to equilibrium. In other words, the ROC as a state began to stabilize and increasingly focused its 
efforts on developing trade, internal economic developments, and political consolidation. The 
ROC became grudgingly accepting of the reality that it would likely remain on the island of 
Taiwan indefinitely. Koo worked to ensure the defense of Taiwan—including the modest 
incorporation of outlying islands such as the Dachens. 
After the loss of mainland China to communist forces in 1949, the status of Taiwan 
became a pressing issue for Americans and Chinese alike. For Americans, the transformation of 
China into a communist state was viewed as a crippling defeat on the Asian front of foreign 
policy. In spite of this defeat, Wellington Koo still referred to Taiwan as China or the Republic 
of China. He referred to it as such, because he believed the Taiwanese government embodied 
values that were the antithesis to those held by the Communist government of the mainland. 
Furthermore, Koo implied that Chinese communism was not an ideology in line with the 
betterment of the situation of the Chinese people. Instead, Koo viewed communism in China as a 
phenomenon perpetuated by authoritarian countries to further the goals of international 
communism.
145
 A majority of American officials held a view similar to Koo’s during this era and 
thus employed the term “Free China” to refer to Taiwan after 1949.  
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Secretary of State John Foster Dulles tirelessly defended Taiwan. In a conversation 
between him, Yeh, and Koo, he said that he did not want Taiwan to rule out the possibility of 
retaking the mainland in order to maintain the hopes of the Chinese people. Dulles argued that it 
was imperative to word a treaty in such a way that Taiwan and the Pescadores would be 
protected in the event of an attack, while not including the minor offshore islands.
146
 In addition, 
Dulles assured Yeh and Koo that the United States had no intention of removing the 7
th
 fleet 
from protecting the Taiwan Strait.
147
  This candid exchange exemplifies the positive relationship 
between Koo and Dulles. It is unclear whether Dulles had an affinity for the Taiwanese 
government or whether he was keen on protecting the interests of the Chinese people. What is 
known is that Dulles adamantly defended his anti-communist stance and his personal obligation 
for upholding the Truman Doctrine.
148
 Unsurprisingly, these values of anti-communism were 
held by Wellington Koo as well, who called Communism a “menace.”149 It is through this 
mutual understanding of the global political situation that Dulles agreed with and supported 
Koo’s request for military support of Taiwan.  
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Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty 
In 1954, the United States and Taiwan signed one of the most significant treaties in the 
history of Taiwan—the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty. The treaty stipulated that if 
either party were attacked, the other party would come to that country’s assistance.150 As such, 
this treaty firmly established a virtual dividing line between the mainland of China and Taiwan 
after the conclusion of the Korean War. Additionally, this treaty served as a resolution to the 
First Taiwan Strait Crisis, wherein the PRC began bombarding off-shore islands near Taiwan in 
September of 1954.
151
 Koo, in a series of talks with Assistant Secretary of State Walter 
Robertson and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, aided in determining the details of a 
defense treaty.
152
  John Foster Dulles argued that the creation of this treaty would dispel mistrust 
between the two countries. As such, in this new situation, procuring aid for Taiwan would be 
considerably more efficient.
153
 In many ways, this treaty represented what Koo, his colleagues, 
and his government desired most from the U.S.—de facto recognition in place of the PRC and a 
framework of peace and stability needed for economic growth.  
Before the U.S.A. and ROC signed this treaty, numerous problems arose. To begin, the 
U.S. State Department did not entirely support the treaty. U.S. officials believed that their 
government already supported Taiwan sufficiently.
154
 Moreover, this treaty led to increased 
unease and heightened tensions, as the PRC was in the middle of conducting a political meeting 
with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (i.e., North Korea). The final issue that arose 
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regarded the details of a Pacific defense treaty. 
155
 As the feeling that Asian people should run 
their own affairs without Western interference became pervasive during this period, Koo 
believed that the United States had no hope of success if it tried to take the lead in implementing 
the treaty.
156
 
The ROC’s dream of procuring guaranteed U.S. military protection seemed only a 
pipedream until just before the treaty was signed. In November, Ambassador Koo felt out the 
opinion of the U.S. towards the creation of a mutually ensured defense zone. From this exercise, 
he discovered that the U.S. government would support the military defensive efforts of the ROC 
government in principle only. This realization undoubtedly frustrated Koo, as he argued that 
non-material support from the U.S. would be useless.
157
 The reasoning behind his assertion is 
rooted in the suspicion that Soviet communist encroachment was an ever-present threat to the 
region in spite of the ceasefire “ending” the Korean War. Taiwan sought cooperation from the 
United States to create a military defense zone not only due to a history of close diplomatic 
relations between the two countries, but also because Thailand, the ROK, and Australia were 
reluctant to enter into such a pact.
158
 Due to the negotiating efforts of Wellington Koo and 
George Yeh, this treaty helped elevate the status of Taiwan on the international stage as the 
China with which the United States entrusted for preserving peace.
159
 This treaty ensured the 
defense of only Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands and not other islands near the mainland’s 
coast.
160
 Nevertheless, Koo’s involvement in drafting this treaty helped develop the concept of 
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“Two Chinas”—an anomaly on the world scene—that effectively equated Taiwan to the much 
more populated and militarized mainland.
161
 This elevation in status placed Taiwan at the 
forefront of international political dialogue. Moreover, the national identity that Koo both sought 
and represented became temporarily secured. As Dr. Koo yearned for stronger relations between 
the West and the ROC, this treaty symbolized a realization of this goal.  
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Ambassador Koo’s map of offshore islands near Taiwan (Formosa) 
The Dachens (Tachens) are the group of roughly 30 islands near Zhejiang (Chekiang) Province 
(Map courtesy of Wellington Koo Papers, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University) 
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At Twin Oakes on January 29, 1955, Robertson and Koo discussed the possibility of an 
evacuation of Nationalist forces from the Dachen Islands. Robertson stated that aid and 
assistance in the case of an evacuation could only be carried out if Taiwan issued a formal 
request. Koo replied that he recommended the request to Chiang Kai-shek, with the inflated title 
of “Generalissimo,” and the Chinese government, and hoped that the situation would be resolved 
accordingly.
162
 In the following months, Dulles temporarily resolved the conflict by warning the 
People’s Republic of China of the possibility of a nuclear strike. Additionally, the Formosa 
Resolution stipulated that the U.S. military would support the ROC in the case of an attack on 
the territories controlled by the ROC.
163
 This military ultimatum issued by the United States 
signified the first application of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty that Koo and other 
statesmen drafted. This ultimatum also signified the beginning of a new era in which ROC 
national identity would be defined by its protection by the United States. 
The Dachen Islands 
 In a top secret document dated January 21, 1955, Koo said that he would propose 
withholding an announcement on policy regarding the Dachens until “Congressional action on 
the joint resolution” (in reference to the Formosa Resolution).164 In this way, he could secure 
Taiwan’s national interests while at the same time not reveal a potentially flawed policy on the 
situation. Several days before Koo’s suggestion of stalling an announcement, a memorandum 
from the State Department on the subject of Defense of Off-Shore Islands asserted that, “China 
and the U.S. will stand shoulder to shoulder in a consolidated position.”165 Thus, through 
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acknowledging the affirmed alliance between United States and Chinese interests in respect to 
the Dachens, Koo ensured swift action by withholding an announcement on China’s view of the 
current state of affairs. Several months later, The New York Times published an article titled, “A 
Formosa Cease-Fire!” This article discussed the ongoing tension and military stress in the 
Taiwan Strait as well as the possibility of a resolution through the United Nations. Most relevant, 
however, Koo was quoted at the beginning of the article as saying that the central issue behind 
attaining a Formosa cease-fire relates to the Communists ceasing to fire on Taiwan.
166
  
This diplomatic maneuver was significant for two key reasons. For one, Koo further 
publicized the Taiwanese stance by being quoted in the most prominent newspaper in the United 
States. Secondly, he tried to convince the American people that the Taiwanese stance was just by 
unambiguously placing all of the blame for conflict in the Taiwan Strait onto Communist forces. 
This tactic would have been necessary and critical, since Koo, acting as a representative of the 
ROC, would have to convince American representatives to pass future resolutions in favor of 
Taiwanese national interests. Not only could these resolutions enact laws that defend Taiwan, but 
also Taiwan could receive additional aid and recognition.  
Democracy, Aid, and Europe 
Recognition of Taiwan on the international scene became an issue after 1949. In 1950, it 
was proposed that the United Nations Security Council should consider the status of Taiwan. 
This question seemed to yield numerous beneficial outcomes as well as drawbacks to Koo. On 
the one hand, Koo argued, discussing Taiwan in the forum of the Security Council would be 
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“useful for the common cause of the democratic countries.”167 Yet, Koo hedged his optimism 
regarding the possibility of using the “Question of Formosa” as a vehicle to promote democratic 
principles at the United Nations. The Soviet Union among other countries in the communist 
block had political motives to address the Taiwan situation head-on. These countries yearned to 
dismiss Taiwan from the Security Council and even from the United Nations altogether. To 
further complicate the matter, Koo learned that the United Kingdom (U.K.) opposed the United 
States’ policy toward Taiwan.168 Policy makers of the era likely would have been surprised by 
this divergence in foreign policy, since the United Kingdom and United States were not only 
allies in World War II, but also shared a long history. The United Kingdom recognized the PRC 
over the ROC in order to protect its commercial interests in China (i.e., Hong Kong).
169
  
Koo asked Acheson if, at his next meeting with European leaders, he would attempt to 
change the minds of the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and France about their stance 
on Taiwan. In this way, these three counties could make a powerful statement at the Security 
Council by upholding the “cause of freedom and peace”170 on behalf of Western style 
democracies. According to the President Woodrow Wilson’s understanding of democracy, 
countries must also spread them. Addressing part of this dual understanding of democracy’s 
purpose was perhaps the angle at which Koo framed his reasoning for asking Acheson to meet 
with France and the U.K.  
 Although Great Britain remained unconvinced in recognizing Taiwan, its former colony 
Australia held a markedly different view. Reports indicated that the vast majority of the country 
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supported the policy of recognizing Taiwan. This opinion was also held by the entire Australian 
Press with the exception of one columnist.
171
  At one point, the Australian Minister of External 
Affairs asked Koo to describe the Chinese Communist Party as he saw it. Koo said that the 
Chinese Communists were not acting on their own accord, but were merely extensions of 
Moscow’s global influence.172 Thus, Koo believed that Taiwan should remain a sovereign state 
in order to serve as a “beacon of hope to the masses on the mainland.”173 Many people on 
Taiwan held this conviction during the 1950s. If Taiwan invaded mainland China as part of a 
reconquering effort, the invading troops would be thought of as liberators rather than aggressors. 
This notion persisted because Nationalists presumed the mainland public would grow weary and 
become disillusioned with the ideology propagated by the communist regime. Koo noted this 
phenomenon by citing instances in which Soviet secret agents disguised as businessmen and 
technicians provided information to Chinese Communist officials in order to stop a potential 
revolt.
174
   Koo portrayed the CCP as an alien force implementing values and policies foreign to 
the Chinese. In contrast, he depicted the ROC as a vanguard to the principles of Chinese 
nationhood articulated by the Nationalist Party founder, Sun Yat-sen. These “Three People’s 
Principles” included nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood—tenets central to Koo’s 
conception of what the ROC’s modern identity ought to be.175  
Trade and Recapturing the Mainland 
Koo used “trade diplomacy” to advance Nationalist Chinese interests. While conversing 
with Austrian ambassador to the U.S. Dr. Loewenthal, he presented the possibility of introducing 
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Taiwanese commodities such as sugar, rice, and citronella oil to Austrian markets.
176
 By 
promoting trade in this fashion, Taiwan would create an economic tie to Europe. Austria and 
Taiwan would thereby share an economic fate. Koo likely used this variant of “trade diplomacy” 
to ensure the development of a mutually beneficial political bond. Although many might argue 
that a Chinese allegiance with Austria was not the most beneficial in terms of the scope of 
international events, Koo nonetheless began incorporating countries into an anti-communist 
block. This block had the potential to stave off Soviet and Chinese Communist advances.  
 Koo also possessed clear opinions regarding the United States’ 7th Fleet’s presence in the 
Taiwan Strait. After the onset of the Korean War, the U.S. moved its ships into the strait in order 
to prevent a communist invasion that utilized the Korean War as a military distraction. In 1953, 
Eisenhower lifted restrictions on the fleet that would allow the ROC to attack the mainland (i.e.,  
“unleash Chiang on the mainland”).177 Koo articulated that this new order was “welcomed by his 
government and his people” and that it remained a goal for the ROC to recover “the Chinese 
mainland one day.”178 This viewpoint from a diplomat is in some ways surprising. Diplomats by 
their very nature avoid conflict. In spite of such traditions, Koo argued that imminent military 
action on behalf of Taiwan would only be beneficial. Koo compared an invasion of the mainland 
as being similar to the conquering of China by nomadic Manchu people to the north during the 
17
th
 century.
179
  Taiwanese forces—like the Manchus—represented only a fraction of the total 
manpower of the Chinese mainland, but could win hearts and minds. Koo believed that his 
country’s military would have no problem convincing the Chinese populace of the destitution 
and misery they experienced during the communist regime. This “convincing” also took the form 
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of ROC funded guerilla warfare on the mainland from 1949-1953. Guerilla forces under the 
sponsorship of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) numbered in the thousands and launched 
attacks into Yunnan province.
180
 This dual policy approach by the ROC demonstrated that 
Taiwan had a chance—albeit a small one—of reestablishing control over the mainland. Thus, 
Koo had reasons to remain optimistic. 
Appeal to the Public  
 Koo used modern media to appeal to the U.S. public. He appeared on a variety of 
television programs such as Longines Chronoscope, Meet the Press, and Youth Wants to Know. 
In a Longines Chronoscope on February 21, 1955, Wellington Koo appealed to the people of the 
United States for support. Early in the interview, one interviewer asked Koo if he believed a 
ceasefire could quell the tensions between the “Two Chinas” in the Taiwan Strait. Koo 
responded to his question by stating that “we [Taiwan] certainly have not been taking the 
initiative to stir up hostilities. It is the Communists who have been bombing and bombarding 
us.”181 Koo attempted to cultivate an image that characterized the Communists as aggressors. 
Additionally, Koo stated that his country could not negotiate peace with the Chinese 
Communists since they were the “tools and puppets of international communism.”182 Koo 
negated the possibility of a peace settlement with the Chinese Communists, since he felt that 
discussing peace with them equated to legitimizing their country and cause. Then again, Koo 
may have simply been stubborn with respect to dealing with the PRC in the face of realistic 
circumstances. 
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 Koo also emphasized the military repercussions of Communist China’s capturing Taiwan. 
He stated that Communist possession of the island would amount to a “breach in the chain of 
defense” of the security of non-communist nations. Furthermore, Koo emphasized that the 
strategic placement of the island could also be used by the Soviets presumably for missile 
placement and/or military bases.
183
 This “scare tactic” confirmed one of the worst fears among 
the U.S. public: the Domino Theory might be true. Through characterizing Taiwan as a crucial 
safeguard against Chinese Communist territorial expansion into the Pacific, Koo compelled 
Americans to remain invested in Taiwan’s future.  Koo’s hope for investment in Taiwan came to 
fruition since the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) continued to remain on the 
island to help in training ROC troops until 1978. 
184
 
 The release of two newspaper reports on March 26, confirmed some of Koo’s worst 
suspicions regarding the PRC. The New York Times and New York Harold Tribune both 
announced that U.S. military officials believed Red China would attack the island of Mazu in 
April and Jinmen soon after.
185
 In part due to Koo’s efforts, the possibility of an attack on 
Taiwan and its island claims ascended to the forefront of America’s national consciousness. At 
this point, American feelings toward the relative importance of maintaining the integrity of 
Taiwan and its islands resembled the crest of a wave. Days later, several additional major 
newspapers published articles concerning PRC encroachment on the ROC. 
186
 
 On May 22, Koo appeared on the television show, Youth Wants to Know that featured 
high-profile figures such as John F. Kennedy and Everett Dirksen. He answered questions 
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regarding the activities of the Chinese Communist Party; the problem of Red China’s entering 
the United Nations, and America’s policy for handling the Taiwan situation.187 This appearance 
afforded Koo the opportunity to appeal to an additional demographic in American society. 
Moreover, by appearing on television programs that featured respected U.S. figures, Koo 
reflected the ambitions of Chinese. These ambitions mirrored the identity of students during the 
May 4
th
 Movement, wherein Chinese yearned for equal treatment on the world stage.
188
  
Unfortunately for Koo, the next day The New York Times published an article mischaracterizing 
his view toward a ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait.
189
 The article stated that Koo was the first of 
Generalissimo Chiang’s aides to favor a ceasefire, which was contrary to ROC policy. Other 
newspapers took notice of Koo’s supposed misstep. For example, Hong Kong’s Kung Sheung 
Daily News published an article titled, “顧維鈞的嚴重失言 [Wellington Koo’s Severe 
Gaffe].”190 In spite of preemptive “careful phrasing” during the interview, this instance of 
confused perceptions of Koo’s policies forced him to backpedal.191 If one adheres to the phrase, 
that any publicity is good publicity, this awkward occasion benefitted Koo and the ROC in 
placing them at the forefront of many major newspapers around the world.  
China Lobby 
The China Lobby constituted the largest base of support in the U.S. for both Koo and the 
ROC. A crucial member of Koo’s network, Henry Luce (founder of Time and Life Magazine), 
supported the ROC tirelessly through his characterization of it as the rightful heir to the 1911 
                                                          
187
 Ibid., 313-314. 
188
 Henrietta Harrison, China: Inventing the Nation, 170-172. 
189
 Ibid., 314. 
190
 Ibid., 315. 
191
 Ibid., 314. 
 74 
 
revolution—thereby corroborating Koo’s vision of China’s modern identity.192 A 1955 article in 
Life titled, “The Crisis of Free China” stated, “Asia is in danger of going Communist by 
voluntary choice.”193 Alarmist articles of this type attempted to persuade Americans to support 
and legitimize “Free China.” In addition, the Committee of One Million, composed generally of 
anti-communist conservatives, remained a prominent force in the mid-1950s. This group worked 
towards convincing politicians and Americans-at-large to oppose the PRC’s admission to the 
United Nations (UN). This committee had limited success with President Eisenhower, but 
achieved allegiance from dozens of U.S. Representatives and Senators who conducted 
“Committee business from inside their own offices on Capitol Hill.”194 The sustained efforts of 
the China Lobby reinforced the pro-U.S. identity adopted by the people of Taiwan. Furthermore, 
Wellington Koo’s involvement in this network of lobbyists characterized him as a patriotic 
Chinese with Western sympathies.  
Retirement 
 By 1956, Koo felt weary.
195
 Previous crises involving Jinmen and Mazu, protection of the 
Dachen Islands, and publicity issues regarding a ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait exhausted Koo. In 
spite of many triumphs over his long career, sustained involvement in diplomacy became 
increasingly difficult at 69 years of age. Since he aided in the implementation of the Sino-
American Mutual Defense Treaty that sustained aid to Taiwan and kept at bay encroachment 
from “international communists,” his work that allowed Taiwan to develop was largely complete. 
With the hope that someday the ROC would return to its previous status as a global power 
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through reconquering the mainland, Koo left the position of Ambassador to the United States 
(Dong Xianguang succeeded him). Despite being less prolific than Ambassador Koo, Dong 
maintained close ties to the U.S. and received praise from the ROC.
196
 Thus, the ROC continued 
along its previously established trajectory within the larger context of the Cold War. 
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Conclusions 
Koo dreamt of a China that would serve as a major power on the international scene. This 
China would maintain aspects of traditional Chinese culture while simultaneously creating a 
modern identity distinct from that of the CCP. As such, he directed his efforts toward resisting 
communist influence in China. Koo argued that “communists do not take nationalism very 
seriously because they all believe in international communism.”197 Thus, Chinese national 
identity as Koo understood it was at stake. Koo also believed that the CCP threatened the “very 
basic foundation of our [Chinese] society—the family.”198 The objective of Chinese Nationalists 
and Koo was to preserve key aspects of traditional China while accomplishing developmental 
goals. These developmental goals included raising the standard of living of people in the ROC 
through foreign aid and creating a powerful military with the assistance of foreign advisors.
199
 
In one sense, Koo’s vision failed to come to fruition. According to Professor C. K. John 
Chu from Columbia University (who had personal connections to Dr. Koo in New York), 
Wellington Koo always negotiated from a position of weakness relative to most other 
countries.
200
 Unlike the Communist leader, Zhou Enlai, Koo lacked the support of roughly 600 
million people that ensured more expansive international influence. Additionally, unlike Zhou, 
Koo never had a position of power equivalent to his as premier. Moreover, Koo and the Republic 
of China faced enormous setbacks by losing control of the mainland in 1949. The result of the 
Korean War in 1953 showed that the PRC possessed the military capacity to fight the United 
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States to a stalemate—thereby making any reasonable ROC attempt to reconquer the mainland 
futile. At the end of his diplomatic career in 1956, Koo’s tangible accomplishments seemed 
sparse.  
At the same time, Koo succeeded globally by creating a long-term, sustained alliance 
with the more powerful of the two global superpowers—the United States. After the 1953 
Korean ceasefire, aid to the ROC increased. The U.S. sustained its economic assistance until 
1964.
201
 Military aid increased as well due to the signing of new defensive agreements such as 
the 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty. In relation to aid, the ROC remained 
exclusively the China with which the United States traded and recognized until 1971.
202
 Koo and 
his network of contacts in the U.S. China Lobby had ensured this revitalized relationship with 
the United States that was maintained decades longer than any policy expert would have 
expected. Koo’s work during this decade (1946-56) contributed to larger efforts that allowed the 
ROC to recover from its defeat on the mainland. 
 In addition, Koo was instrumental in ensuring that the ROC remained a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council more than a decade after Koo’s retirement. The 
territorial holdings of the ROC remained nearly intact from 1949 through the present due to ROC 
treaties and negotiations linked with U.S. military support. Broadly adopted anti-communist 
foreign policy allowed the ROC to be the sole China recognized by the ROK up until 1992.
203
 
Koo succeeded in aligning national security interests of the ROC with that of South Korea and 
the United States in securing the stationing of the U.S. 7
th
 fleet in the Taiwan Strait. From the 
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U.S. perspective, the fleet served as a protective barrier against the so-called Domino Effect of 
regional nations falling to communism due to communist takeover in one neighboring nation.  
 In the current era, Chinese on the mainland and abroad view Wellington Koo as a 
hero.
204
 Chinese praise Dr. Koo for the same reasons that they praise the 19
th
 century Qing 
official Commissioner Lin Zexu. In an era when opium ravaged Chinese society, Commissioner 
Lin destroyed millions of pounds of opium in the hope of healing a country of ill health and 
corrupted morals. However, this action proved futile with the initiation of the Opium War of 
1839 by Western powers.
205
 Koo and Lin both symbolized adherents to lost but morally upright 
causes.  Although Koo’s international background and Anglo first name distanced him from the 
shared experience of Chinese common people, he nonetheless dedicated his career to “giving 
back” to China. Specifically, he championed the causes of Chinese freedom and self-
determination—similar in scope to Wilsonian Idealism.206 Koo’s PhD dissertation on 
international law and diplomacy titled, “The Status of Aliens in China,” set him on course for a 
career as a diplomat and later as a judge dedicated to solving China’s international problems. In 
his dissertation, Koo expressed his personal philosophy in writing, “If, to the intelligent and 
intensely patriotic efforts of the Chinese people to regenerate their country, there are added the 
sympathy and moral support of the treaty powers, the rise of a powerful and progressive China 
will surely be hastened a hundred-fold.”207 
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 Given the aforementioned evidence, Wellington Koo should be considered a cunning 
diplomat whose dreams for China’s political future became increasingly separated from reality 
since the PRC remained firmly entrenched on the mainland by the end of his diplomatic career. 
However, his legacy lives on due to the continued success and stability of the ROC and the 
preservation of an independent ROC identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 80 
 
Bibliography 
Archival Sources: 
 
United States Government. National Archives and Records Administration. Correspondences 
with Wellington Koo. Eisenhower Papers, boxes 10, 12, 14, 294, 313, 328, 357, 361, 
499, 531, 712, 713, and 748, The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and 
Museum, Abilene, KS.  
 
United States Government. National Archives and Records Administration. Correspondences 
with Wellington Koo. Truman Papers, boxes 151, 152, 757, and 758, The Harry S. 
Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.  
 
United States Government. National Archives and Records Administration. Our Documents: 100 
Milestone Documents form the National Archives. President Wilson’s Message to 
Congress, January 8, 1918, Washington, D.C. 
 
United States Government, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States. 
Washington, D.C. 1946-1951. 
 
Wellington Koo Papers, boxes 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 159, 161, 180, and 187, Columbia 
University Rare Book and Manuscript Library, New York, NY.  
 
 
 
Published Primary Sources: 
 
Bullitt, William C. The Great Globe Itself. New York: Scribner’s, 1946. 
 
Gu, Weijun 顧維鈞. Gu Weijun Huiyilu 顧維鈞回憶錄 [Wellington Koo Memoirs]. Shanghai: 
Zhonghua Shuju 中華書局, 1985. 
 
Interim Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics. Moscow, December 16-26, 1945. 
 
Koo, Wellington. “The Status of Aliens in China.” PhD diss., Columbia University, 1912. 
 
“Longines Chronoscope with Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo.”  Longines Chronoscope. February 21, 
1955. 
 
“Longines Chronoscope with Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo.”  Longines Chronoscope. May 26, 1952.  
  
 81 
 
“Longines Chronoscope with John Foster Dulles.”  Longines Chronoscope. February 1, 1952.  
 
Mao, Zedong. On New Democracy. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2003. 
. 
UN General Assembly. 1971. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758: Restoration of 
the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations. New York 
City: United Nations. 
 
United States Senate. Appendix 17 of Report on Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of 
China, Committee on Foreign Relations, Article 6, 1955. 
 
 
Secondary Sources: 
 
Aseniero, George. “South Korean and Taiwanese Development: The Transnational Context.” 
Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center 17, (1994): 275-336. 
 
Atkinson, George W. “The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.” 
 International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 23, no. 3 
 (July 1947). 
 
Bachrack, Stanley D. The Committee of One Million: “China Lobby” Politics 1953-1971. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1976. 
 
Birtle, Andrew. “The Marshall Mission: A Peacekeeping Mission that Failed.” Military Review 
80, (March/April 2000): 99-103. 
 
Buchanan, Tom. East Wind: China and the British Left, 1925-1976. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012. 
 
Chai, Winberg. “Missile Envy: New Tensions in China-U.S.-Taiwan Relations.” Asian Affairs: An 
American Review, (March 2007): 39-40. 
 
Chang, Su-Ya 張叔雅, “Zhong Mei Gongtong Fangyu Tiaoyue de Qianding.” 中美公同防禦條
約的簽訂 [Reluctant Alliance: John Foster Dulles and the Making of the U.S.-ROC 
Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954]. Zhongyang yan jiu yuan oumei yanjiu suo中央研
究院歐美研究所 24, (1994): 51-99. 
 
Compton, Christine. Our Documents: 100 Milestone Documents from the National Archives, ed. 
Michael R. Beschloss. New York City: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Craft, Stephen G. V.K. Wellington Koo and the Emergence of Modern China. Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2004. 
 
 82 
 
Eastman, Lloyd E. “Who Lost China? Chiang Kai-shek Testifies.” The China Quarterly 88, 
(December 1981): 658-668. 
 
Furuya, Keiji. Chiang Kai-shek: His Life and Times. New York: St. John’s University, 1981. 
 
Harrison, Henrietta. China: Inventing the Nation. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Herzstein, Robert E. Henry R. Luce: A Political Portrait of the Man Who Created the American 
Century. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994. 
 
Hosch, William L. The Korean War and the Vietnam War: People, Politics, and Power. New 
York City: Rosen Publishing, 2009. 
 
Jin, Guangyao 金光耀, Gu Weijun Zhuan顧維鈞傳 [Biography of Wellington Koo]. Baoding: 
Hebei Renmin Chuban She 保定:河北人民出版社, 1999. 
 
Kaufman, Victor S. “Trouble in the Golden Triangle: The United States, Taiwan, and the 93rd 
Nationalist Division.” The China Quarterly, no. 166, (June 2001): 440-456. 
 
Lin, Cheng-yi. “The Legacy of the Korean War: Impact on U.S.-Taiwan Relations.” Journal of 
Northeast Asian Studies, (Winter 1992): 41-57. 
 
MacKerras, Colin. The New Cambridge Handbook on Contemporary China. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 177-186. 
 
Manela, Erez. “The Wilsonian Moment and the Rise of Anticolonial Nationalism: The Case of 
Egypt.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 12, no. 4, (December 2001): 99-122. 
 
Milestones: 1953-1960, U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/Taiwan. 
 
Myers, Ramon H. Two Chinese States: U.S. Foreign Policy and Interests. Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1978.  
 
Neils, Patricia. China Images in the Life and Times of Henry Luce. Savage: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1990.  
 
Perdue, Peter C. “The Anglo-Chinese War of 1839-1842.” Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Accessed February 14, 2013. 
http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/opium_wars_01/ow1_essay02.html 
 
Public Broadcasting Service. “China-Taiwan History.”  Last modified March 2000. 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/china/china-taiwan.html. 
 
 83 
 
Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American 
Relations, 1945-1996. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.  
 
Tung, William. V.K. Wellington Koo and China’s Wartime Diplomacy. New York: St. John’s 
University, 1977. 
 
University of Tennessee. “Romantic Politics: Orientalism.” 
http://web.utk.edu/~gerard/romanticpolitics/orientalism.html. 
 
Van Slyke, Lyman.  The China White Paper: August 1949. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 
1967. 
 
Wang, Yu-San. Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan: An Unorthodox Approach 
  Westport: Praeger, 1990. 93-95. 
 
Weintraub, Stanley. MacArthur’s War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero.  New 
York: Free Press, 2008. 
